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I. Introduction
In Washington, DC in September 1995, Yasser Arafat, the
chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Yitzak
Rabin, the late Prime Minister of Israel, signed an agreement
which many hoped would lead to the normalization of relations
between their peoples.' Since that signing, the Middle East has
seen the PLO in Tunisia return to parts of the West Bank and Gaza
to begin the process of forming a government.2
However, while Yasser Arafat and the PLO have been forming
a governing body in the West Bank and Gaza, PLO fedayeen3
I See Connie Bruck, The Wounds of Peace, NEW YORKER, Oct. 14, 1996, at 64,
79.
2 See id. at 76.
3 Following the lead of William V. O'Brien and the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv
University, I am using the term fedayeen to describe PLO members who have engaged
in attacks against Israel. The term fedayeen roughly translates as "those ready to
sacrifice themselves." See WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, LAW AND MORALITY IN ISRAEL'S WAR
WITH THE PLO 17 (1991) (citing YEHOSHAFAT HARABI, ARAB STRATEGIES AND ISRAEL'S
RESPONSE 171 (1977)). While most Israelis consider these people terrorists, the
fedayeen consider themselves soldiers fighting for a free Palestine. See id.
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remain in Israeli jails.4 These men are labeled as terrorists by the
Israeli government and denied the prisoner of war status they have
sought! Such status would prevent criminal prosecution for most
acts taken during wartime' and create the understanding that those
who have been taken as prisoners will be released at the end of
hostilities.7 Instead of treating captured PLO fedayeen this way,
the Israeli government has tried, convicted, and sentenced them as
criminals.8
The Israeli government's treatment of PLO fedayeen has
created a troublesome legal and political situation. While the Oslo
Accords have allowed the PLO and Yasser Arafat to return to the
West Bank and Gaza as the legitimate representatives of the
Palestinian people,9 Israel still regards the PLO's past violent
struggle as illegitimate and the people who waged it as terrorists. 0
Ultimately this belief may lead to a situation where two states sit
beside each other with one holding as criminals people the other
regards as Founding Fathers.
The presence of the PLO fedayeen in Israeli prisons has
become a hot button issue in the ongoing negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority." In these negotiations the
Israeli government has had to take into account both the legal
arguments for releasing or holding on to these people and the
4 See Ilene R. Prusher, Two Mothers Pine for Sons as Mideast Peace Churns On,
CHRjSTIAN So. MoNiTOR, Jan. 29, 1997, at 6; Prison Cross-Dressers Foiled in Break-
Out Bid, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 12, 1996, available in 1997 WL 2798972.
5 For a discussion of Israel's treatment of PLO fedayeen, see infra notes 240-61
and accompanying text. In February 1997, Israel released the last female Palestinian
prisoners whom it held. See 30 Palestinian Women Prisoners Freed, JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 12, 1997.
6 See infra notes 429-37 and accompanying text (describing the prosecution of
war crimes).
7 For an overview of prisoner of war law see infra notes 177-94 and
accompanying text.
8 For a description of Israel's treatment of PLO fedayeen see infra notes 240-61
and accompanying text.
9 See generally Bruck, supra note 1, at 64-91 (describing the return of the PLO to
the West Bank and Gaza).
10 See infra notes 240-61 and accompanying text.
1 See Teddy Preuss, War Criminals and Other Offenders, THE JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 12, 1997.
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political effects that doing either would create. While releasing all
Palestinian prisoners would satisfy Palestinian political demands,
it would also anger many Israelis who oppose releasing those they
regard as rank murderers. 2 But refusing to release all Palestinian
prisoners could hamper future negotiations with the Palestinian
Authority and dim chances for a lasting peace.
The legal analysis of the position of PLO fedayeen in Israeli
jails is based upon whether or not the PLO's past violent struggle
should now be considered legitimate. To answer this question
international law on privileged combatancy must be examined. If
PLO fedayeen should now be considered privileged combatants,
then those who are in Israeli jails would deserve the corresponding
status of prisoners of war. If they are not privileged combatants,
then they can still be treated as criminals. The criminal nature of
the means which many of those fedayeen used to achieve their
political ends must also be considered. Because their actions were
at times violations of the laws of war, 3 granting PLO fedayeen a
measure of legitimacy by extending to them privileged
combatancy would not correspondingly legitimize the criminal
tactics which may have been used.'4  Such acts would still be
punishable criminally even if committed by privileged combatants.
Adding to the confusing nature of the situation is the fact that
while the Oslo Accords did not explicitly deal with the prisoner of
war status of PLO fedayeen, they did call for a series of prisoner
releases by the Israeli government. 5 The releases have been
limited, with certain narrowly defined groups having their
sentences commuted. 16  This can either be viewed as purely
political in nature or as partial acknowledgment of a legal right. If
purely political, then the releases were simply part of the give and
12 See id.
13 See infra notes 111-39 and accompanying text.
14 See Preuss, supra note 11. The significance of these violations is that if
privileged combatancy and the corresponding prisoner of war status was granted to PLO
fedayeen in Israeli jails, only those who were not convicted of actions which fall under
the rubric of war crimes would be released. For a discussion of the prosecution of war
crimes see infra notes 429-37 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text.
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take of negotiations. But if they are a partial acknowledgment of a
legal right, then they lend credence to the idea that the status of
PLOfedayeen in Israeli jails needs to be re-examined.
Answering the question of the prisoner of war status of PLO
fedayeen has implications which go beyond the fate of the roughly
3000 Palestinians who remain in Israeli jails." How observers
answer this question depends upon how they view the claims of
Palestinian nationalism and the issues underlying the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in general. Certain conflicting assumptions lie
behind the different positions on this question.
Chief among these is whether what is being created in the
West Bank and Gaza is a state in the international legal sense of
the word. The issue of Palestinian nationalism lies at the heart of
whether the PLO was a legitimate army fighting a legitimate war.
This issue may come to the forefront if the question of prisoner of
war status is decided before a legal tribunal instead of during
political negotiations.
This Comment will explore the legal considerations behind re-
examining the prisoner of war status of PLO fedayeen. S The main
issue will be whether combatants who have been denied prisoner
of war status should be granted that status retroactively when the
movement they fight under gains legal and political recognition.
This issue will be explored in the contexts of the Israeli legal
system and of international law. The political considerations
17 See Preuss, supra note 11. In a letter to the author, the Palestinian Society for
the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment stated that approximately 2,985
Palestinians remained in Israeli jails as of February 14, 1997. Letter from the
Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment to the
author (Feb. 14, 1997) (on file with the author).
18 This Comment will only address the status of PLO fedaveen. Members of
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizballah, etc., will not be considered. This decision is based on
Israel's recognition of the PLO in the Oslo accords. This recognition and the embryonic
PLO government in the West Bank and Gaza are the foundations for re-examining the
issue of the prisoner of war status of Palestinians in Israeli jails. Because this recognition
has largely been limited to the PLO, this Comment will also limit itself thus. This
Comment of course excludes from consideration many Palestinians who were arrested
for actions taken against Israel who are not formally tied to any group. But as is
explained in Part III, prisoner of war status is traditionally limited to persons serving
within a military chain of command. See infra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
This limitation is not intended to question the validity of extending any amnesty
programs to reach prisoners unaffiliated with the PLO.
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raised by these issues will be briefly acknowledged, but the
primary concern will remain the legal aspects of this issue.
Part II of this Comment will give the background of the Israeli-
PLO conflict.9 In Part III, an overview of the relevant
international treaty law on prisoner of war status will be
provided.20 Part IV will examine Israel's application of that treaty
law to PLO fedayeen.2 Part V will discuss the applicable law in
regard to re-examining the status of PLO fedayeen.22 In Part VI,
the effects of violations of the laws of war by prisoners of war will
be noted. Part VII of this Comment will discuss the possible
forums where this issue can be litigated.24 Finally, the Conclusion
in Part VIII argues that while no solid legal argument for granting
prisoner of war status to PLO fedayeen exists, the political
considerations for granting an amnesty should be closely
explored.
II. The Background of the Israel-PLO Conflict
A. Pre-History of Israel/Palestine
The current conflict between Arab and Jew in the Middle East
is rooted in the history of the region, with both sides making
extensive historical claims to the same land. Over 3,000 years ago,
according to the Bible, the ancient Hebrews fled Egypt and
eventually entered Canaan, an area encompassing what is today
Israel/Palestine,26 and took the land as their own.27 Except during
19 See infra notes 26-176 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 177-239 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 240-86 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 287-428 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 429-37 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 438-48 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 449-55 and accompanying text.
26 Throughout the section dealing with the time prior to 1948, the land
encompassing what is today the State of Israel and the territories of the West Bank and
Gaza will be referred to as Israel/Palestine. While this nomenclature sacrifices historical
accuracy for the sake of simplicity, the confusion which could be created by trying to
differentiate the many names used for the area in question over the centuries far
outweighs the benefits. Also of consideration is that the borders of the many political
entities which have controlled the area have varied dramatically. Quite often the area
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certain intervals, notably the Babylonian exile,2" the ancient
Hebrews lived in this area until the time of the Roman Empire.29
In the First Century B.C., Pompey took Israel/Palestine.3" In
70 A.D., the Temple, which was the central focus of the Jewish
religion, was destroyed during a revolt by the population against
Roman rule.3 Following a second revolt in 132 A.D., the majority
of the population was dispersed by the Romans throughout the
Empire.32 This is known as the Diaspora.3
After the fall of the Roman Empire, different groups controlled
Israel/Palestine. By the middle of the 7th Century, followers of
the prophet Mohammed conquered the area, along with northern
Africa, Spain and the rest of what is toddy the Middle East.34 Over
the next four centuries, an Islamic culture developed throughout
the Middle East, including Israel/Palestine. 3 While this culture
developed, political hegemony in the region was in a state of flux
with different groups coming to the fore.36
In 1096, the First Crusade, made up of Christians from
Western Europe and spurred on by the preaching of Pope Innocent
had no political existence of its own, but instead existed as part of a larger whole. To
accurately differentiate the many boundaries would require recourse to an extensive
series of maps, which is unavailable in this forum. Sufficient to say, the name Israel
derives from Biblical times. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: 2000 YEARS OF
HISTORY FROM THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE PRESENT DAY 23-24 (1995). Palestine
was the name adopted by the Romans in the Second Century AD, after the Philistines
whom the ancient Hebrews had conquered in taking Canaan. See id. at 31.
27 See J. ALBERTO SOGGIN, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT ISRAEL 138-71 (1984).
28 See id. at 250-57. The belief that the entire population was taken into exile in
Babylon has been challenged. See id.
29 See id. at 336.
30 See id. at 310-11.
31 See id. at 311,327-31.
32 See id. at 311, 334-37.
33 See THE NEW JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 112 (David Bridger et al. eds., 1976). Jews
not living in Israel are still considered to be living in the Diaspora. See id.
34 See ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 22-23 (1991).
35 See id. at 43-54.
36 See generally HOURANI, supra note 34, at 22-262; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 51-
129 (for a more in depth explanation of the different political dynasties during this
period).
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the III, invaded Israel/Palestine.37 The presence of European
Crusaders in Israel/Palestine was to last on and off until 1244,
when they were expelled by Turan Shah.3" In the following
centuries, the Ottoman Empire, centered in what is today Turkey,
established dominion over the whole Middle East, including
Israel/Palestine.39
After World War I, Israel/Palestine became part of the British
Mandate of Palestine in the Middle East.4 What is today Jordan
made up the other half of the Mandate. 41  During this time, the
trickle of Jews which had begun returning to Israel/Palestine
during the late nineteenth century turned into a steady stream.42
This stream turned into a flood following the Holocaust and the
end of World War II.4 3 While Britain attempted to staunch the
flow of Jews into Israel/Palestine, their efforts were undermined
by an organized effort by the Yishuv, which was the name for the
Jewish community within Israel/Palestine.44
B. The Creation of the Modern State of Israel
The movement of Jews into Israel/Palestine was part of the
Zionist movement's effort to recreate a Jewish homeland.4  This
influx created tensions with the Arabs already living in the area."4
These tensions led to violence between the two communities with
37 See LEWIS, supra note 26, at 90.
38 See id. at 104,401.
31 See id. at 114.
40 See id. at 343; BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND
NOTES: ISRAEL 2 (Mar. 1, 1995).
41 See LEWIS, supra note 26, at 343-44.
42 See id. at 347-48; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
43 See id. at 361-62; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
44 See HOWARD M. SACHAR, A HISTORY OF ISRAEL: FROM THE RISE OF ZIONISM TO
OUR TIME 267-70 (1979).
45 See generally ARTHUR HERTZBURG, THE ZIONIST IDEA 15-100 (1959) (for a more
in depth description of Zionist ideas); DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
46 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 163-67, 171-73. This tension was caused not
only by differences in religion and culture, but by a displacement in both land and jobs.
Jewish immigrants displaced Arab laborers and purchased land from absentee Arab
landlords, displacing local Arab peasants. See id.
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the British caught in the middle.47 After many years, of attempting
to retain the status quo, the British turned the issue over to the
newly formed United Nations.48 While the Yishuv, led by David
Ben-Gurion, desired the formation of a Jewish homeland in part of
Israel/Palestine, the Arabs in Israel/Palestine and the surrounding
Arab states opposed this.49
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations' General
Assembly voted in favor of a plan that would partition
Israel/Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state." The areas
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, together with what is today
northwestern Israel along the Lebanese border, would have made
up the territory of the Arab state." Jerusalem was to be an
international city, while the Negev Desert in the south, most of the
coastal region and the Galilee Valley in the northeast were to make
up the Jewish state.52
Instead of a peaceful partition occurring under international
supervision, British refusal to cooperate and Arab non-recognition
of the United Nations' authority led to violence. 3 The level of
violence between Arab and Jew escalated as the British began
pulling their forces out of Israel/Palestine, with the conflict
eventually turning into a full scale civil war. 14 On May 14, 1948,
while fighting raged throughout the area, Ben-Gurion declared the
47 See id. at 173-78; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 362. The British government's
restraint on Jewish immigration and their actions towards Jewish-Arab disputes led to a
revolt by a faction in the Yishuv. See J. BOWYER BELL, TERROR OUT OF ZION 104-38
(1977). Two groups, LEHI and the Irgun, waged a terrorist campaign to drive the
British out of Israel/Palestine. See id. The main body of the Yishuv at times sided both
with and against these splinter groups. See id.
48 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 279-83 (1979); LEWIS, supra note 26, at 362.
49 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 279-83; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363; DEP'T OF
STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
50 G.A. Res. 181 (II) of Nov. 29, 1947; SACHAR, supra note 44, at 292-95; LEWIS,
supra note 26, at 363; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
51 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 292-95.
52 See id.
13 See id. at 295-301; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363-64; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note
40, at 2.
54 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 292-95.
1997]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
independence of the new State of Israel.5
The Declaration of Independence by the newly formed state
was quickly followed by an invasion by the surrounding Arab
states.56 Israel was eventually able to repel the Arab armies and
establish control in an area greater than what it was given under
the U.N. Partition Plan." In the process, a massive wave of Arab
refugees fled the areas which became Israel, settling throughout
the Arab world.5" The territory now known as the West Bank was
taken by Transjordan, while Egypt gained control over what is
now the Gaza strip. 9 While the fighting was eventually ended by
an armistice, no peace agreements were signed by the warring
parties.6'
C. The Arab-Israeli Wars
The end of fighting had left the new State of Israel staring
across hostile borders at its Arab neighbors. While Israel
consolidated its position, many of its neighbors planned its
destruction. Israel's population was harassed by a constant stream
of cross-border guerrilla raids.6 The West Bank and Gaza, with
their large refugee populations, were the source of many of these
raids. 62  These raiders were known as fedayeen, or those who
sacrifice themselves.6 s Israel often resorted to retaliatory measures
against the villages from which these fedayeen came and against
55 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 311; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363; DEP'T OF
STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
56 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 314-19; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363-64; DEP'T
OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2. The invading forces were made up of the armies of Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Transjordan, now known as Jordan. See SACHAR, supra note
44, at 317-19.
51 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 330-36; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363-64.
58 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 330-36, 436-43; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363-64.
59 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 347-53; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363-64.
60 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 347-53; LEWIS, supra note 26, at 363-64; DEP'T
OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
61 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 443-53; Gunther E. Rothenberg, Israeli defense
forces and low-intensity operations, in ARMIES IN Low-INTENsrrY CONFLICT: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 54-59 (1989); DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
62 See Rothenberg, supra note 61, at 54-59.
63 See id. at 58.
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the neighboring states which harbored them."M
Tensions came to a head in 1956 when Israel, along with
France and Britain, invaded the Sinai Peninsula over disputes
stemming from Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal.65
Retaliating against thefedayeen bases located in the Sinai was also
an additional motivation for Israel.6M Pressure from the two
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, eventually
forced Israel, France, and Britain to withdraw.67 But war erupted
again in 1967 when Israel invaded Syria, Jordan, and Egypt in a
pre-preemptive strike to forestall an invasion of Israel.68 In the
1967 war, Israel took the entire Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip
from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights
from Syria 9 Along with this land came control over the large
numbers of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank.70
War once again broke out between Israel and its Arab
neighbors in 1973.71 Egypt and Syria launched an attack against
Israel which almost succeeded in driving Israel's forces off of the
Golan and out of the Sinai. But military assistance in the form of
much needed supplies was sent by the United States, and Israel
was able to hold its positions in both the Golan and the Sinai. 3 In
the decade following the 1973 war, United States brokered
negotiations were able to bring Egypt and Israel to the peace
table.74 In exchange for normalization of relations and the promise
of the demilitarization of the Sinai by Egypt, Israel agreed to
6 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 443-53; Rothenberg, supra note 61, at 54-59.
65 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 485-97; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
" See Rothenberg, supra note 61, at 58-59.
67 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 503-10.
68 See id., at 625-39; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 2.
69 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 667-73; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 3.
70 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 667-73.
71 See id. at 746-62.
72 See id. at 746-62; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 3.
73 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 766-84; DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 40, at 3.
74 See WILLIAM B. QUANDT, PEACE PROCESS: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT SINCE 1967 183-331 (1993) (providing a history of the peace
process leading up to the Camp David Accords).
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return the Sinai to Egypt.75 The Gaza Strip was not included in the
territory returned to Egypt.
7 6
D. The Emergence of the PLO
While Israel engaged in recurring conflicts with its Arab
neighbors, a burgeoning guerrilla campaign against Israel by
Palestinians outside Israel's borders also evolved from the moment
of the state's creation.77 When Israel was established in 1948,
huge numbers of Palestinian Arabs living in what became Israel
fled their homes. 7' These refugees, along with the inhabitants of
the West Bank and Gaza, make up the Palestinian people.79
It was from this Palestinian population that the PLO emerged.
Guerrilla raids by Palestinian fedayeen began almost as soon as
Israel was founded. " These raids were in large part a mere
continuation of the violence which existed between the Arab
community and the Yishuv prior to 1948.81 After the Yishuv's
victory in 1948, many Palestinian Arabs who had taken part in the
pre-state violence fled to the surrounding Arab states and formed
loose knitfedayeen groups.82 These groups were closely tied to the
governments in their host countries, at times being little more than
proxies for governments unwilling to risk their own troops. 3
75 See id.
76 See'id.
77 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 33-34.
78 See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text (discussing the formation of
Israel).
79 Many of the people living in Jordan are also Palestinians, even though they are
not refugees from Israel/Palestine. This is because the area which is today Jordan made
up the eastern half of the Ottoman district of Palestine and the British Mandate of
Palestine. Consequently, those Arabs whose families have lived in this area since that
time consider themselves to be Palestinians. This identity is reinforced by the fact that
the rulers of Jordan are members of the Hashemite dynasty, natives of the Arabian
Peninsula installed by the British in the inter war years. See LEWIS, supra note 26, at
363-64.
80 See O'BRiEN, supra note 3, at 33-34.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 443-50 and 682-83; Rothenberg, supra note 61,
at 55-59.
[Vol. 22
POW STATUS OF PLO FEDA YEEN
Although the PLO was not created until 1964,84 its most
powerful component, the Fatah, was established in the mid-1950s
by Yasser Arafat.85 Arafat first began as a fedayeen leader in
Egypt, but in 1957 he moved his headquarters to Syria.16 In Syria,
his Fatah fedayeen were able to strike across the Syria-Israel
border with the encouragement of the Syrian government.87 In
contrast, the Egyptian government under Nasser began restraining
fedayeen activity following the 1956 Sinai War.8
In 1964, the PLO was created in Jerusalem to serve as an
umbrella organization for various fedayeen groups. The
organization served primarily as a government tool under Egyptian
president Nasser and Syrian king Salah Jadid." Its first chairman
was Ahmed Shukeiry, a Palestinian attorney, whose tenure lasted
but three years.9' Having led PLO involvement in the 1967 War,
the disastrous defeat of Arab forces, for whom the PLO was seen
as a procy, ruined his reputation.2
Following this war, the Fatah, headed by Arafat,
commandeered control of the PLO, and Arafat became the PLO's
official chairman.93 Among his first efforts as the organization's
new leader was urging Palestinian residents of the West Bank and
Gaza, who had just come under Israeli control, to resist their
annexation. 4 Rather than relying completely upon cross-border
attacks, the PLO now attempted to create an armed rebellion inside
84 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 619.
85 See id. at 682-83.
86 See id. It should be noted that Arafat is a member of the powerful Husseini
family whose patriarch during World War II was the Mufti of Jerusalem, who led the
Palestinian Arabs in Israel/Palestine during the civil war with the Yishuv. See id.
87 See id.
88 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 33-34. Nasser's restraining influence was not a
symptom of any love for Israel. Rather, it was in response to the Israeli military
retaliation against Egyptian forces forfedayeen using Egypt as a staging ground. See id.
89 See Rothenberg, supra note 61, at 60. At first, the PLO and Fatah were rivals.
See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 619.
90 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 619-20.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 633-34, 683.
93 See id. at 698.
94 See id. at 682-86.
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Israeli controlled territory."
The newly reformulated PLO was unable to touch off a
popular armed uprising in the West Bank.96 In fact, the Israeli
suppression of their activities soon forced the PLO to rely on
cross-border attacks from Jordan.97 However, the PLO was more
successful in the densely packed Gaza Strip.98 Arafat's forces held
great power in Gaza until 1971, when the new commander of the
area, Ariel Sharon, carried out brutal counter-measures and
effectively ended the PLO's power in Gaza.99
After the PLO was forced to operate out of Jordan in 1968,
tensions between the Jordanian King and the PLO guerrillas in his
country escalated."' These tensions eventually exploded in 1970,
with the Jordanian military decisively defeating the PLO and other
fedayeen groups.01 Forced out of Jordan, the PLO took up
residence in southern Lebanon and Syria, creating a PLO
controlled area in Lebanon, known as "Fatahland." 12
From Lebanon, the PLO was able to fall back on its tradition
of cross-border raids into Israel."3 These tactics eventually
escalated, with the PLO relying on large artillery and rocket
attacks into Israeli population centers in the north.' 4 A series of
reprisal attacks by Israel occurred until finally in 1982, Israel
launched a full scale invasion of Lebanon to drive the PLO out of
the country.' 3 The invasion was successful in driving much of the
91 See id.
96 See id.
97 See id. The PLO's failure can be attributed to both the efficiency of the Israeli
security forces and a lack of support for such an uprising among the West Bank
population. See id.
98 See id. at 684-85.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 685-86. This was due not only to the PLO's left-wing stance which
placed it in political opposition to the monarchy, but also to the largely Palestinian
population of Jordan, which the king felt was a threat to his power. See id.
101 See id. The battles which drove the PLO out of Jordan are memorialized by the
PLO as "Black September." See id.
102 Id. at 686, 698.
103 See id. at 697-702.
104 See Rothenberg, supra note 61, at 70.
105 See id. at 70-71; O'BRiEN, supra note 3, at 41-52.
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PLO out of Lebanon, except for forces in the north protected by
Syria. 6 While the main body of the PLO set up headquarters in
Tunisia, internecine warfare among thefedayeen who remained in
Lebanon broke out.117 The end result of this fratricide was the
expulsion of Arafat from Syria and the removal of the remaining
Fatahfedayeen to Tunisia.'08
While Fatah was largely based in Tunisia, many of the other
factions were able to retain a presence in Lebanon and re-instituted
border attacks when Israel pulled its forces back to southern
Lebanon. 9 By the late 1980s the long dreamed of popular
uprising in the West Bank and Gaza occurred in the form of the
Intifada. 10
E. PLO Tactics
The PLO and Fatah traditionally relied on small scale cross-
border guerrilla attacks."' While the PLO has attacked military
units, the great majority of its attacks have been against counter-
value targets-i.e., non-combatant civilians.' These attacks have
included indiscriminate killing in border villages,1 taking school
children hostage,' 4 storming hotels in Tel Aviv, "5 attacking school
buses"6 and planting explosives in public places.' 7 The goal has
essentially been to infiltrate small groups of fedayeen into Israel,
106 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 52.
107 See id. at 52-53.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 52-56.
110 See id. at 222-26. The Intifada was a violent uprising in the West Bank and
Gaza which occurred in the late 1980s. Its hallmark images were of Palestinian youth
hurling rocks and molotov cocktails at Israeli Army Patrols. The Intifada was able to
bring much of the normal existence in these areas to a halt while simultaneously
focusing the international spotlight on the Israeli occupation.
"' See id. at 11-18.
112 See id. at 16.
113 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 444, 810-11.
114 See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 44-45; SACHAR, supra note 44, at 810.
115 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 810-11.
116 See id. at 697.
117 See id. at811.
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and then create as much havoc as possible."'
These tactics were chosen based on the knowledge that the
PLO could not compete militarily with Israel."9 Except after the
1967 War when the PLO tried to initiate a popular uprising in the
occupied territories, the PLO has not seriously tried to engage
Israel militarily.2 ' Instead, with the goal of being seen as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO has used terror
attacks to gain publicity for itself and to provoke the Isrealis into
harsh counter reprisals."2 The PLO hoped that these reprisals
would in turn cause world public opinion to shift against Israel
when its raids on PLO camps caused large civilian casualties
among the surrounding populace.' Further, the PLO hoped to
pull the surrounding Arab countries into the conflict.'
After the PLO failed to create an armed uprising in the wake of
the 1967 War, the organization changed its tactics to include
attacks on Israel outside of its borders.'24 Because of increased
border patrols and the effectiveness of reprisal raids, cross-border
attacks were becoming less and less effective. In reaction, the
PLO faction, known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) pioneered the idea of attacking Israeli citizens
outside the borders of Israel. 2 ' This new tactic took advantage of
the fact that outside of its own territory Israel was unable to
118 See O'BRiEN, supra note 3, at 13-18.
19 See id. at 7-18.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id. It should be noted that such civilian casualties occurred because PLO
forces resided among the populations they recruit from, the Palestinian refugee camps.
Therefore, any assault by air or artillery against PLO forces had a high chance of
causing civilian casualties. See id.
123 See id. Israeli reprisals often included attacks against the country from which
fedayeen had infiltrated. The Israeli goal was to make supporting the PLO so painful to
the Arab countries that support for the PLO would eventually dry up. The PLO tried to
use Israeli tactics against Israel in order to widen the conflict from an Israel-PLO war to
one involving the Arab states. This in fact occurred when Israel invaded Lebanon in
1982 to attack PLO bases and Syria was pulled into the conflict. See id. at 18-26.
124 See SACHAR, supra note 44, at 697-702.
125 See id. at 699.
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provide the same level of security it could within its borders. 26
These new tactics led to some of the most infamous
international terrorist incidents of the 1960s and 1970s. PLO
fedayeen carried out numerous airline hijackings and bombings,
murdered a group of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich
Olympics, 127 attacked Jewish retirement homes in Europe,12 1 killed
Israeli embassy employees in South America, 12 murdered an
Israeli attach6 in Washington D.C.,'3" and attacked synagogues
throughout the world. 3'
By the late 1970s, the PLO began using a new series of tactics.
With their bases in Lebanon, the PLO began to establish the
rudimentary nucleus of a conventional army.'32 They began
deploying large quantities of artillery pieces, rocket launchers and
other heavy equipment in the south of Lebanon,"' even including a
large number of heavy tanks.'34 Their forces soon took on the
appearance of an organized -army, but with the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon and the PLO's escape to Tunisia, the PLO quickly
reverted to its old tactics.'35 It should be noted that even when the
PLO had a large force of conventional weaponry it frequently
targeted Israeli population centers in the north instead of engaging
the Israeli military itself.'36
The PLO's tactics throughout its history have largely been
focused on harassing the populace of Israel and creating terror.
37
Intentional engagements with the Israeli military, while occurring,
126 See id.
127 See id. at 701. The group which attacked the Israeli team members called itself
the Black September Organization, which was essentially a front group for the Fatah.
See id.




132 See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 41-47.
133 See id. at 44, 47.
134 See id. at 47.
135 See id. at 52-55.
136 See id. at 133, 140.
137 See id. at 11-18.
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have not been frequent.'38 Even during the Intifada, the violent
uprising which occurred in the West Bank and Gaza, conventional
military attacks on the Israeli military were uncommon."'
F. The Intifada
The Intifada was in spirit an uprising against an occupying
power.' Large parts of the populations of both the West Bank
and Gaza Strip began a revolt against Israeli control, bringing
normal life in the areas to a stand still.1 4  The Israeli military was
forced to send in large numbers of troops to try and control the
situation. 4 Rather than being instigated by the PLO, the Intifada
occurred spontaneously, only later coming under the control of the
PLO. 143
The most important aspect of the Intifada for this discussion is
the role it played in bringing Israel to the negotiating table. Israeli
actions against Palestinian rioters, often only adolescents, pushed
world opinion against Israel. Pressure mounted on Israel,
especially from the United States, to begin negotiations with the
Palestinians. At first Israel refused to negotiate with the PLO.
Because the PLO charter explicitly denies Israel's right to exist.'"
Questions about the PLO refuting terrorism as an instrument of
policy were also brought to the fore.45 But by 1992, when Yitzak
138 See id.





144 See Shmuel Katz, A Very Pernicious Process, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 27, 1997.
Eventually this section of the PLO Charter was repudiated by Arafat and he promised to
have it removed from the document by the Palestinian National Council. See id.
However, the Palestinian National Council has yet to formally strike that language from
the Covenant and the issue was again taken up in the negotiations over Israeli
withdrawals from Hebron which occurred in January 1997. See Barton Gellman,
Netanyahu Wins Vote on Hebron; Israeli Cabinet Approves Past After Heated Debate,
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1997, at Al.
145 See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 59-64. This issue was interwoven with the
question of whether Arafat was able to control all the factions making up the PLO.
Being an umbrella organization, not all groups were loyal to Arafat. See id.
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Rabin became Prime Minister, peace negotiations with the
Palestinians, the Jordanians, and the Syrians were under way.'
46
G. The Oslo Accords
While official negotiations went on in Washington, back
channel negotiations between Israel and the PLO were under way
in Oslo, Norway. 41 It was out of these negotiations that a peace
agreement was reached.48 Two sets of agreements were eventually
signed. The first set was a Declaration of Principles149 agreed to in
August 1993 and signed in Washington on September 13, 1993,
known as "Oslo I. ' " The second set, "Oslo II, ' '" ' was much more
comprehensive and was signed in September 1995 in
Washington.12 These two sets of agreements gave control over
certain areas in the West Bank and Gaza to the PLO.'53 While
Israel was to control the borders of both territories, a Palestinian
authority was to have civil control over Palestinian areas. 54 The
area under full Palestinian control was at first to be very small, but
the accords envisioned a gradual expansion of Palestinian control
and a concomitant withdrawal of Israeli forces.'55 Expansion of
Palestinian authority and Israeli pull backs were to occur in a three
part process, with the West Bank and Gaza split into three areas,
designated A, B, and C.'56 The first phase placed area A under
Palestinian control, while authority in area B was to be shared with
Israel maintaining overall control of security issues.' 7 Area C was
146 See Bruck, supra note 1, at 68.
147 See id. at 68-73.
148 See id.
149 Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
150 See Bruck, supra note 1, at 73.
151 Interim Agreement On The West Bank And The Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995,
Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization, 36 I.L.M. 557 [hereinafter Interim Agreement].
152 See Bruck, supra note 1, at 79.
153 See id. at 68-79.
154 See id. at 74-79.
155 See id. at 76-79.
156 See id. at 77-79.
157 See id.
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left entirely under Israeli control. 5' The second phase was to
occur in September 1996, with Israel beginning withdrawal from
area B.'59 Phase three is scheduled to begin in September 1997.'60
The accords envisioned final permanent status negotiations to be
carried out in the future.
61
This same gradual approach was also used for prisoner
releases. Thousands of Palestinians have been taken prisoner over
the last five decades. Following the signing of Oslo I, over 4,500
Palestinian prisoners were released in May 1994.162 The Oslo II
Accords also called for a limited amnesty towards Palestinian





162 See Deborah Horan, Israel-Palestine: Many Still Behind Bars, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Oct. 10, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10134846.
163 The text of Oslo II reads :
ANNEX VII-RELEASE OF PALESTINIAN PRISONERS AND
DETAINEES
1. The release of detainees and prisoners, as agreed upon in Article XVI of
this Agreement will be carried out in three stages.
2. The following categories of detainees and/or prisoners will be included in
the above mentioned releases:
a. all female detainees and prisoners shall be released in the first stage of
release;
b. persons who have served more than two thirds of their sentence;
c. detainees and or/prisoners charged with or imprisoned for security
offenses not involving fatality or serious injury;
d.detainees and/or prisoners charged with or convicted of non-security
criminal offenses; and
e.citizens of Arab countries being held in Israel pending implementation
of orders for their deportation.
3. Detainees and prisoners from among the categories detailed in this
paragraph, who meet criteria set out in paragraph 2 above, are being
considered by Israel to be eligible for release:
a. prisoners and/or detainees aged 50 years and above;
b. prisoners and/or detainees under 18 years of age;
c. prisoners who have been imprisoned for 10 years or more; and
d. sick and unhealthy prisoners and or/ detainees.
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the release occurred in October 1995, following the signing of the
Accords.' " Close to 900 prisoners were released, including almost
all female prisoners.1 65 The second phase, during which over 800
prisoners were released, occurred before the Palestinian elections
held in January 1996.'6 The final phase of prisoner releases is
scheduled to take place during the permanent status negotiations.'67
The release of prisoners held in Israeli civilian jails has
occurred under the authority of the president of Israel.168 This is
because the president, although in a largely ceremonial position,
has the power to commute sentences handed down by Israeli
Courts.' 9 Prisoners who were tried by Israeli military courts in the
West Bank and Gaza are released under the authority of the head
of the military governments in the two regions.17 Neither of these
officials are legally bound by the Accords to automatically pardon
or commute a prisoner's sentence.' In fact, President Weizman
refused to commute the sentences of four Palestinian women
during the first release, because they had been convicted of
murder.' When the issue was taken to court, the Israeli Supreme
4. The third stage of release will take place during permanent status
negotiations and will involve the categories set out above, and may
explore further categories.
Interim Agreement, supra note 151.
164 See Horan, supra note 162.
165 See Israel and the Palestinians: Prison Potholes, supra note 5, at 53. The
release of all female prisoners was completed in February 1997. See 30 Palestinian
Women Prisoners Freed, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 12, 1997.
1 See MIDDLE EAST/AFRICA: Palestinian Release, JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY,
Jan. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9480238; Israel Frees Prisoners, APS DIPLOMAT
RECORDER, Jan. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8933522.
167 See Horan, supra note 162.
168 See id. The president of Israel is Ezer Weizman. See id.
169 ISRAEL BASIC LAW: PRESIDENT OF THE STATE § 11 (b) (June 1993) (translation
from Hebrew into English by A.G. Publications Ltd.); ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE LAW OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL: AN INTRODUCTION 52 (1992); Barton Gellman, Israel Backs Off Pact
On Inmates: Won't Free 4 Convicted of Homicide, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 7, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 10545623.
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Court approved this use of the president's discretion.'73
Because of this and other issues, the extent to which prisoners
will be ultimately released is unclear. The language of Annex VII
of Oslo II on the release of prisoners states that some categories of
prisoners will be definitely released, some prisoners among other
categories will be considered for release and that "further
categories" may be explored. 7 4  Whether the final release will
include only some or all members of the groups up for
consideration is not known, and the prospect of exploring "other
categories" now seems largely ephemeral."' Because of the
vagueness of this part of the Accords, deciphering the intent of the
negotiators is extremely difficult, and with the change in the Israeli
government, these provisions will likely be read as narrowly as
possible. This leads to the conclusion that most PLO fedayeen
who have not yet been released will probably not be released
under this amnesty, especially considering President Weizman's
earlier refusal to release prisoners with "blood on their hands."'76
III. International Law on Prisoners of War
A. Overview of Prisoner of War Status
In the not so distant past, captured soldiers could expect to be
sold into slavery or to be put to death. ' History has provided
many examples of such brutality, from Roman consuls whose
173 See Israeli Supreme Court Rejects Freeing Palestinians, APS DIPLOMATIC
RECORDER, Oct. 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8163373. These women, along with
others who had refused amnesty in solidarity with them, have since been released. See
30 Palestinian Women Prisoners Freed, supra note 5.
174 Interim Agreement, supra note 151.
175 This is based on the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the prime minister
of Israel. He has stated that he will abide by the agreements past Israeli governments
have signed with the PLO, but he has also taken a conservative line in regard to any
future concessions by Israel.
176 Gellman, supra note 169. Most PLO fedayeen have been tried in the Military
Court system. See William V. O'Brien, The PLO In International Law, 2 B. U. INT'L
L.J. 349, 404 n.205 (1983). The military commanders with the power to commute
sentences, however, have followed President Weizman's lead in deciding who to set
free. See Gellman, supra note 169.
177 See generally ALLAN RoSAS, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 43-81 (1976)
(providing a discussion of the evolution of prisoner of war status).
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heads were used as polo balls by Sassanid Emperors to defeated
armies thrown into slavery or put to the sword by the Roman
Legions. 7 ' But today, soldiers captured during war can expect a
certain level of restraint from their captors.7 9 This includes the
right to adequate food and shelter, the right to be free from torture
and, most importantly for PLO fedayeen, freedom from criminal
prosecution for most acts taken during hostilities and, finally, the
right to be repatriated at the end of hostilities.'
The rights accorded to prisoners of war are based on the idea
that soldiers are engaged in hostilities under the authority of their
sovereign and are therefore exempt from the normal bonds of law
as privileged combatants. 1 Upon capture, privileged combatants
are held as prisoners of war even though their acts, if taken during
peacetime, would normally make them criminals. 2 As prisoners
of war, they are free from prosecution for such acts."' It is also
expected that prisoners of war will be released at the end of
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See INGRIDDETER DE LupIS, THE LAW OF WAR 281-90 (1987).
181 See R.C. HoNGoRANi, PRISONERS OF WAR 9-10 (1982); ROSAS, supra note 177, at
81-84; W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular
Combatants under the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 9 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 39, 40-43 (197); see also Waldemar A. Soilf & Edward R. Cummings, A
Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 205, 213 (1977) (analyzing killing which occurs
during lawful wartime operations as justifiable homicide).
182 See HiNGORANI, supra note 181, at 9-10; ROSAS, supra note 177, at 305-13. It
should be noted that many combatants denied prisoner of war status are executed by
their captors. See DE Lupis, supra note 180, at 119. In general, Israeli policy has been
to not impose the death penalty on PLO fedayeen. Subsequently, Adolph Eichmann is
the only person in Israel to have been actually sentenced to death and executed. See
BiN-NuN, supra note 169, at 116-17. Israel's policy makes re-examing the status of
PLOfedayeen something more than an academic exercise because such a re-examination
could have tangible effects.
183 See HiNGORAmn, supra note 181, at 9-10. This is not to say that soldiers are free
to do as they like. Soldiers breaking the laws of war will be held to answer for their
crimes. The right of privileged combatancy is not a right to kill and pillage as one likes.
See generally DE Lut'IS, supra note 180, at 232-63 (describing prohibited methods of
warfare). Also see infra notes 429-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of PLO
fedayeen's culpability for violations of the laws of war.
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hostilities. '"8 This is because prisoners of war are not held as
criminals.'85 Rather, they are held to prevent them from taking
future actions against their captors. When hostilities are over that
need is gone.'86
Freedom from prosecution and release at the end of hostilities
are the greatest benefits that PLO fedayeen would derive from
prisoner of war status. However, up until the late nineteenth
century, international law generally only granted privileged
combatancy to the regular armies of a sovereign involved in a
military conflict.'87 Over time, privileged combatancy has been
extended to cover some combatants outside the regular armed
forces, but only if they have met certain criteria.'8 These criteria
are aimed at making privileged combatants distinguishable from
the normal civilian population and ensuring that privileged
combatants obey the laws of war.'89 Being able to distinguish
between the civilian population and privileged combatants is
thought to be to the benefit of all involved.' 9 Soldiers benefit
because they can tell whether they are facing an enemy soldier and
need to prepare for hostilities. Soldiers unable to distinguish
between privileged combatants and civilians are more likely to
attack civilians under the theory that it is "better to be safe than
sorry."'' Armies may also carry out indiscriminate attacks
I1 See ROSAS, supra note 177, at 81-84.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 43-45; see also infra notes 195-239
and accompanying text.
188 See Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 43-45; see also infra notes 195-239
and accompanying text (examining the treaties spelling out these criteria and the gradual
expansion of privileged combatancy which has come along with those treaties).
189 See DE LuPIS, supra note 180, at 106-12. In fact, one of the most important
criteria which must be met is that the combatants follow the rules of war. Israeli courts
used PLO fedayeen's failure to adequately distinguish themselves from the civilian
populations and to obey the laws of war as reasons to deny them privileged combatant
status. See infra notes 240-61 and accompanying text (describing the Israeli legal
position on the prisoner of war status of PLOfedayeen).
190 See DE LUPIS, supra note 180, at 106.
191 But, as already noted, it can be to the advantage of one side to blend seamlessly
with the civilian population. This is to avoid capture or in a more ruthless vein, to
provoke retaliation against the civilian populace in order to create international
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because the low intensity operations necessary to distinguish
between civilians and disguised combatants are extremely time
consuming and costly in terms of casualties.1 92  Therefore,
avoiding such indiscriminate attacks by making it easy to
distinguish civilian from combatant is generally in the best interest
of civilian populations. 93 In this way, the ability to distinguish
between civilians and combatants also helps ensure that
combatants obey the rules of War.
194
B. International Treaty Law
1. Introduction
The criteria necessary to be considered a privileged combatant
have been embodied in a number of international treaties.195 In the
indignation against the retaliating country, and to swell sentiments against the attacker
among the civilian population. See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 13.
192 Another reason for indiscriminate attacks on mixed populations of civilians and
hidden combatants is to hamper what Mao Tse-Tung referred to as the need for
revolutionaries to be able to mingle with the population like fish in the sea. See MAO-
TSE TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 92-93 (Samuel B. Griffith, trans.) (1961). By
retaliating against the civilians among whom the disguised combatants hide, an
opponent may seek to turn the population against the hidden combatants. This is based
on the rationale that civilians are less likely to give aid to a hidden combatant if they
know that their village is likely to be attacked when that hidden combatant uses it as a
base of operations. See O'BREN, supra note 3, at 18-26.
193 That is to say, generally it is in the best interests of the civilian population in
terms of avoiding indiscriminate attacks. It could be argued that allowing combatants to
mix easily among the civilian population is in the best interests of that population if
those same combatants are fighting to liberate that population. This would require a
weighing of the positives and negatives inherent in either being the target of
indiscriminate attacks or of being kept in a state of occupation.
194 A cynical observer would point out that this logic requires liberation movements
to make themselves easy targets in order to prevent atrocities by the other side. This
places the liberation movement in the position of having to endanger the civilians or
give up their greatest weapon, surprise. As one writer has observed, "[T]he hallmark of
any resistance movement is concealment." DE LuPIs, supra note 180, at 112.
195 See, e.g., Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention of
1907]; Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364; Geneva Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144, 16 I.L.M.
1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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practice of international law, lawyers traditionally look to these
treaties for guidance. The criteria they contain have evolved over
time, with a gradual loosening of the rules allowing privileged
combatancy to be granted to groups, such as resistance
movements, which were traditionally treated as criminals instead
of soldiers.196 One purpose of this Comment is to show that the
treaties binding Israel have not expanded these criteria to the point
where they would allow prisoner of war status for PLOfedayeen. 97
The major treaties on the issue of prisoners of war are the
Hague Conventions of 1907,198 the Third Geneva Convention of
1949,199 and the 1977 Protocol I addition to the Geneva
Conventions.2 It should be noted that international treaties are
not the only foundation for international law."1 International law
can also be formed by the actions and practices of states which
create customary international law. °20 While this Section will only
deal with privileged combatancy as described in international
treaties, Section V will examine the issue of whether customary
international law provides different criteria for granting privileged
combatancy. °3
2. The Hague Convention of 1907
The Hague Convention of 1907 is the basis of much of the
current law on prisoners of war.20 4 It was the culmination of a
196 See G.I.A.D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS 26-47 (1958); ROSAS,
supra note 177, at 85-96 (discussing the expansion of the right to privileged combatant
status).
197 See infra notes 204-39 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which
privileged combatancy has been extended).
198 Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 195.
199 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 195.
200 Protocol I, supra note 195.
201 See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-57 (1989).
202 See id. at 35-41.
203 See infra notes 287-428 and accompanying text.
204 See ROSAS, supra note 177, at 86-93. The Hague Convention of 1907 was a
renewal of the Hague Convention of 1899. See id. Both of the Hague Conventions built
upon the Brussels Declaration of 1874. See Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 43-
45. The Brussels Declaration was never ratified by the governments that produced it.
See id. at 45.
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movement, started in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, to
inject humanitarian concepts into the maelstrom of war.2"5 Its
criteria for granting privileged combatant status to those outside
the regular armies of sovereigns was as follows:
Section I.--On Belligerents
Chapter .- The Qualifications of Belligerents
Article 1.
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies,
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following
conditions :
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the
army, or form part of it, they are included under the
denomination "army."
Article 2.
The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied,
who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms
to resist the invading troops without having had time to
organize in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as
belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the
206laws and customs of war.
"Militia" and "volunteer corps" have been interpreted to mean
21units connected to a sovereign power. 07 Such militia or volunteer
corps may be non-professional units fighting alongside or in the
place of regular army units or independent units indirectly
205 See id. at 56-75. These concepts were intended to lessen the cruelty of war on
both soldiers and civilians.
206 Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 195, at 36 Stat 2295-96.
207 See DE Lutls, supra note 180, at 106-11, 50-51; see also Mallison & Mallison,
supra note 181, at 45 (arguing that while irregular combatants must be connected to a
state which is a party to the conflict, they do not have to have the authorization of that
state to participate in hostilities).
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connected to a state.208 As one writer has said, this language means
that the "[r]egular forces of belligerents may include 'militia or
volunteer corps,"' while in other situations "militia and volunteers
are separate from the regular forces and form the core of what is
called 'irregular forces."'2 9 In both situations, such units must
carry arms openly, follow the rules of war, wear a distinctive
insignia, and be led by a responsible party.21
While Article 1 would authorize resistance movements
fighting in the territory of a sovereign occupied by an opposing
power, liberation movements fighting on behalf of a colonized
people would not be authorized because of the absence of a
connection to a state.' While these two types of movements may
seem similar, resistance movements are generally thought of as
combatants whose territory has been occupied and are fighting
against an occupation.212 On the other hand, liberation movements
are usually connected to Third World peoples fighting to end a
period of colonization.213 While the distinction may seem slight,
its basis is the relationship between the movement and a sovereign
state. The resistance movement's sovereign has lost a war or
control of part of its territory, while the "liberation movement" is
usually not linked to a sovereign.
14
During the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo, the Hague Convention of 1907 was held to be customary
international law, binding on all states. 215 However, the Hague
208 See DE Lupis, supra note 180, at 106-11.
209 See id. at 108-09.
210 See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 195, at 36 Stat 2295-96.
211 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
212 See DE LUpIs, supra note 180, at 48-49.
213 See id. at 43-45.
214 Id. at 43-49. The denial of privileged combatant status to "liberation
movements" has often been attacked as a European invention to deny colonized peoples
their right of self-determination. The people in colonized areas find themselves in a no
win situation. In order to have privileged combatant status, they must represent a
sovereign government. But in order to create that sovereign government, they must
fight to push out the colonizing power. So while fighting, they are denied privileged
combatant status. For a discussion on whether privileged combatant status should attach
retroactively see infra notes 308-39 and accompanying text.
215 See DRAPER, supra note 196, at 12 (quoting Judgment of the Tribunal, Cmd.
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Convention of 1907 now has largely been replaced by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.216
3. The Third Geneva Convention of 1949
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were a response to the
inadequacies in the international laws of war, which became
apparent after World War Il.217 The Third Geneva Convention
expanded the scope of privileged combatancy'to explicitly include
some groups not mentioned in the Hague Convention of 1907.
The relevant sections of the Convention reads:
Article 4.
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who
have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces;
(2) Members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance
movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
6964, pp. 64 and 125).
216 See ROSAS, supra note 177, at 91.
217 See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE To THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 3-10 (1960)
[hereinafter ICRC]. Between the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 came the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. See id.
Because this convention has largely been superseded by the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949, it will not be discussed. For the few instances where the Geneva Prisoner of
War Convention of 1929 may still be controlling law, see ROSAS, supra note 177, at 91-
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(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war;
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power....'"
The language of Article 4A(2), specifically its inclusion of
"resistance movements," expanded the scope of privileged
combatancy to explicitly allow the citizens of an occupied state to
resist an occupation.219 The treatment of partisan resistance
movement during World War II by Axis forces led to this• 220 ul
expansion. But, unlike the Hague Convention, the Geneva
Convention's language explicitly requires the resistance or militia
forces to be linked to a Party to the Conflict, thus excluding
liberation movements. 22' Resistance movements must also still
clearly distinguish themselves from the civilian population by
following the four criteria laid out in the Hague Conventions of
1907.222 With the retention of the Hague Convention's language,
the rights of an occupied citizenry to resist occupying forces are
still restricted. Few occupied peoples will have the ability to
organize into the types of well regulated units called for by Article
218 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 195, at 3320 (emphasis added).
219 See ICRC, supra note 217, at 49-50.
220 See id. at 52-61. German forces denied privileged combatant status to resistance
forces, often carrying out summary executions. See RoSAS, supra note 177, at 297-98;
see also Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 47-49.
221 See ICRC, supra note 217, at 56-59; see also Mallison & Mallison, supra note
181, at 50-53 (arguing that this provision can be read as requiring irregular forces to be
either connected to their own state or to another state which is a Party to the Conflict).
But see Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 53-55 (explaining the argument that
organized movements may themselves be considered to be a Party to the Conflict if they
meet certain criteria).
222 See ICRC, supra note 217, at 56-59. These are criteria which the movement
itself must meet, so that combatants will be judged not only on their behavior, but also
by their comrades in arms'. See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the
Question of Guerrilla Warfare, 1971 BRT. Y.B. INT'L L. 173, 196; Mallison &
Mallison, supra note 181, at 62-63. On an individual basis, members must wear a
distinctive sign, carry arms openly, and follow the laws of war in order receive
privileged combatant status. See id.; see infra notes 240-61 and accompanying text
(discussing Israel's application of this analysis).
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4A(2). 22
Based on the number of signers, the Geneva Conventions of
1949 have become one of the most widely accepted international
treaties of all time. As of January 31, 1997, 188 states had become
parties to the Geneva Conventions.224 But with the wave of
decolonization which followed World War II, its restrictions on
"liberation movements" came under harsh attack by many writers
and governments from the Third World.225  The laws of war, as
formulated largely by the European powers, were regarded as
merely tools to reinforce Western hegemony over the Third
World.226 It was partially out of this desire to expand the rights of
"liberation movements" that the 1977 Protocols I & II were
born.227
4. 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
The 1977 Protocols I & II dealt with two separate spheres in
the law of war. While Protocol I related to international conflicts,
Protocol II dealt with internal conflicts. It is Protocol I which is
relevant to this discussion. 22  In comparison to the Hague
223 See DE Lupis, supra note 180, at 112.
224 See International Committee of the Red Cross, States party to the Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols (visited Feb. 17, 1997)
<http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/2cde.htm#7> [hereinafter ICRC Home Page].
225 Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War, 3 ANNALS INT'L
STUDIES 93 (1972). For a critique of the arguments put forward by the supporters of
national liberation movements, see David E. Graham, The Diplomatic Conference on the
Law of War: A Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the "Just War" Concept of
the Eleventh Century, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 25 (1975). For a response to Graham's
critique, see James E. Bond, Amended Article 1 of Draft Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions: The Coming ofAge of the Guerrilla, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 65 (1975).
226 See Graham, supra note 225, at 38.
227 See R.R. Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARv. INT'L LAW J. 1 (1975)
(describing the political conditions prevalent during the 1974 Diplomatic Conference
which began the process of producing Protocol I); see generally Graham, supra note
225.
228 Protocol I declares that it applies to wars of liberation, Article 1(4) stating that
the Protocol applies to situations which "include armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in
the exercise of their rights of self determination .... " Protocol I, supra note 195, art.
1(4), 16 I.L.M. at 1397.
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Convention of 1907 and the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,
Protocol I granted privileged combatancy much more readily to
irregular combatants. Its relevant portions state:
PART III-
Section II-Combatant and Prisoner of war Status
Article 43--Armed forces
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse
Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system, which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict.
Article 44-Combatants and Prisoners of war
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the
power of an adverse Party shall be a Prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations
of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to
be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse
party, of his right to be a Prisoner of war, except as
provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population
from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while
they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there
are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature
of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided
that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while
he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the
launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph
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shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of
Article 37, paragraph 1(c).
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party
while failing to meet the requirements set forth in the
second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a
Prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given
protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to
Prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this
Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to
those accorded to Prisoners of war by the Third Convention
in the case where such a person is tried and punished for
any offenses he has committed.
2 9
These provisions, taken in context with Article 1(4),23° grant
prisoner of war status to members of liberation movements. 23'
Article 43(1) on "armed forces" includes the armed forces of a
party that is not a government but an "authority" even if it is
"unrecognized by the adverse party., 232 This would allow citizens
in an occupied territory, fighting under the command of a
liberation movement to claim the liberation movement as the
"authority" required under Article 43(1).233 In addition, Article
44(2) grants prisoner of war status even to combatants who violate
the laws of war,2 34 while Article 44(3) greatly reduces the required
distinctions between combatant and civilian.235 Read literally,
Protocol I may do away with the four criteria first laid out in the
Hague Convention of 1907 and reiterated in the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949.236
229 Protocol I, supra note 195, art. 43, 44 and 16 I.L.M. 1410-11.
230 Article 1(4) states that Protocol I applies to "armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes
in the exercise of their rights of self-determination.. . ." Id. at 1397.
231 See W.J. Fenrick, Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists, 79 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 109, 113 (1985).
232 Protocol I, supra note 195, art. 43(1), 16 I.L.M. 1410.
233 See Fenrick, supra note 231, at 113-14.
234 See Protocol I, supra note 195, art. 43(1), 16 I.L.M. 1410.
235 See id. at 1411.
236 Some writers disagree with this obituary, stating that the distinguishing criteria
have only been rephrased, not negated. See DE LuPis, supra note 180, at 112-17.
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While Protocol I purports to greatly expand privileged
combatant status, its binding effects over the current issue are
limited. Some western countries, fearful of the legal shield it could
give to "terrorist" movements, refused to sign. Consequently,
neither the United States nor Israel have signed,237 arguing that the
Protocols provided too few reasons for liberation movements to
obey the laws of war.238  Because of Israel's refusal to sign, the
binding effects of Protocol I over the Israel-PLO conflict are at
best debatable.239
IV. Israeli Law and the Current Legal Status of PLO
Fedayeen
A. Israel's Application of the Third Geneva Convention to
PLO Fedayeen
Israel ratified the Third Geneva Convention on July 6, 195 l.240
Since then, Israel has consistently denied the requests of PLO
fedayeen seeking prisoner of war status, citing their failure to meet
the criteria laid out in Article 4A.24'
In Military Prosecutor v. Ohmar Mahmud Kassem,242 the
Military Court operating in the West Bank denied prisoner of war
status to members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) who had infiltrated the West Bank from
237 See ICRC Home Page, supra note 224. As of January 31, 1997, 147 states had
ratified Protocol I. See id.
238 See Letter from Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, to the Senate of
the United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910-12 (1987); Christopher Greenwood, Terrorism
and Humanitarian Law--The Debate Over Additional Protocol 1, 19 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM.
RTs. 187 (1989). This analysis of Protocol I has been challenged as inaccurate by
different writers. See Greenwood, supra note 238, at 207; Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appeal
For Ratification By The United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 912-25 (1987).
239 See infra notes 340-46 and accompanying text (discussing Protocol I as
illustrating customary international law).
240 See International Committee Of The Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 (visited Feb. 17, 1997)
<http://www.icrc.org/icrcnews/2286.htm>.
241 See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
242 42 INT'L L. REP. 470 (1971). See also Dr. Nitza Shapiro-Libai, Territories
Administered By Israel: Military Proclamations, Orders and Judicial Decisions:
Extracts, 1 ISR. Y.B. oN HUM. RTs. 456 (1971) (explaining the court's holding).
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Jordan.243 In denying them prisoner of war status, the Court stated
that the PFLP members did not meet the criteria of Article 4A.2"
In adjudicating the issue, the Court interpreted the Convention as
requiring a combatant to be related to a Government or State
responsible for their actions.245 In referring to combatants who did
not fight under the authority of a State, the Court said, "They are
to be regarded as combatants not protected by the international law
dealing with prisoners of war, and the occupying Power may
consider them as criminals for all purposes."246
The Court went on to hold that even if the PFLP could be said
to have been fighting under the authority of a "Party to the
conflict," they would still be denied prisoner of war status because
of their failure to meet the four criteria required of irregular
combatants under Article 4A(2).2 47 The defendants failed the first
condition by not being able to prove that they were "commanded
by a person responsible for his subordinates." 248 While the Court
did find that they had a distinctive insignia,249 they failed to both
"carry arms openly," and conduct "their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of War."250
243 See Kassem, 42 INT'L L. REP. at 470, 473. The PFLP is one of the groups
making up the PLO. See O'BRIEN, supra note 3, at 11.
244 See Kassem, 42 INT'L L. REP. at 475-83. See supra notes 217-27 and
accompanying text (detailing Article 4A).
245 See id. at 476-78. But see Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 71-72
(arguing that this interpretation requiring state control, in contrast to some lesser
connection, over irregular units was abandoned following the Brussels Declaration and
the Hague Convention); Georg Schwarzenberger, Human Rights and Guerrilla Warfare,
1 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 246, 249-52 (1971) (making the same argument).
246 Kassem, 42 INT'L L. REP. at 477.
247 See id. at 478-483.
248 Id. at 478. This highlights the difficulty an underground combatant would have
demonstrating the existence of a responsible command structure without relinquishing
the names of his leaders, whose identities would need to remain secret for security
reasons.
249 See id. The court found the distinctive insignia requirement met because the
PFLP wore green clothing and mottled hats. See id.
250 Id. at 478-83. The Court pointed to PFLP acts which:
were all wanton acts of terrorism aimed at men, women, and children who were
certainly not lawful military objectives. They are utterly repugnant to the
principles of international law, and according to the authorities quoted are
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In Military Prosecutor v. Abu-Kabar,25" ' a Military Court
likewise refused to grant prisoner of war status to members of
Arafat's Fatah organization. Following the principles explained in
Kassem, the Court stated that not only was Fatah not a "Party to
the conflict" but that they did not meet the four criteria required of
irregular combatants under Article 4A(2).252 The Court also
pointed to the case of Mohamed Ali v. Public Prosecutor,"3 where
the English Privy Council held that even if a combatant belonged
to a "Party to the conflict," failure to meet the four criteria laid out
in Article 4A(2) would result in forfeiture of prisoner of war
status.
254
While these two cases are illustrative of Israel's legal approach
to evaluating prisoner of war status of PLO fedayeen,255 Israel has
taken other approaches on a limited basis. During the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980s, Israel captured many PLO
fedayeen during conventional engagements.256 Israel treated these
fedayeen not as criminals or as prisoners of war, but as
"'detainees' under the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War."257 Many of these
crimes for which the perpetrators must pay the penalty. Immunity of non-
combatants from direct attack is one of the basic rules of the international law
of war.
Id. at 483.
251 See Fania Domb, Judgments of Military Courts in the Administered Territories:
VIII Shi330/68, Military Prosecutor v. Abu Kabar, 7 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 265 (1977)
(citing Military Prosecutor v. Abu Kabar et al, 2 S.J.M.C. 45 (Hebrew, 1972)).
252 See id. at 266.
253 3 All E.R. 488 (1968), reprinted in 42 INT'L L. REP. 458 (1971); see also R.R.
Baxter, The Privy Council on the Qualifications of Belligerents, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 290
(1969) (explaining the court's holding). The Mohamed Ali case involved Indonesian
soldiers in civilian clothing who were captured after planting a bomb in a Singapore
office building which killed three civilians. The defendants were eventually hung. See
Baxter, supra, at 296.
254 See Domb, supra note 251, at 265.
255 See Zvi Hadar, Chapter V. The Military Courts, in MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN
THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980 198-201 (Meir Shamgar ed.,
1982); Benjamin Rubin, PLO Violence and Legitimate Combatancy: A Response to
Professor Green, 19 IsR Y.B. HUM. RTS. 167, 183-85 (1989) (both citing these cases as
indicative of the Israeli position).
256 See O'Brien, supra note 176, at 404.
257 Id.
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"detainees" were later released in a prisoner swap, with Israel
releasing roughly 4,500 Palestinians in exchange for Arafat's
Fatah releasing six Israeli soldiers captured during the invasion of
Lebanon.258
While this release may lend credence to the argument that
Israel has at times treated PLO fedayeen as de facto prisoners of
war, the Israeli position has remained steadfast that PLO fedayeen
in Israeli jails are criminals, not prisoners of war.29 As one writer
has pointed out, Israel views such releases as analogous to
situations where governments are forced to concede to the
demands of kidnappers in order to save the lives of the kidnap
victims.26
The current Israeli position on the legal status of PLOfedayeen
is unmistakably clear. Ambassador Colette Avital, the current
Israel Consul General in New York City, recently stated:
There is no basis for the proposition that Palestinian prisoners
have in any way gained the right to prisoner of war status
following the conclusion and implementation of the Interim
Agreement. This is reflected in the case law of the Israeli High
Court which, on the basis of both conventional and customary
International law, indicates that individuals arrested by Israel
for acts committed against the security of Israel or its citizens
are not prisoners of war regardless of their membership in the
PLO or any other organization. The rationale and legal
foundation of this position have not been changed by the legal
instruments of the peace process."'
258 See id. at 407-08; see also Edward Walsh, Israel Joyfully Welcomes 6 Home
After PLO Swap; 'A Very Heavy Price' Paid for the Release, WASH. POST, Nov. 25,
1983, at Al. The release included sixty-three prisoners convicted as terrorists. See id.
259 See Rubin, supra note 255, at 183-85.
260 See O'Brien, supra note 176, at 407; Rubin, supra note 255, at 183-85.
261 Letter from Ambassador Colette Avital, Israeli Consul General in New York
City, to Christopher C. Burris, Staff Member, North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation. (Jan. 3, 1997) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Avital Letter].
1997)
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
B. Israeli Treaty Law
1. Introduction
In denying prisoner of war status to PLO fedayeen the Israeli
courts have relied on the text of Article 4A of the Third Geneva
Convention. 62 In doing so, they have explicitly applied the
provisions of an international treaty which Isreal has signed to
domestic criminal cases. In contrast, their courts have refused to
apply Protocol I because it has not been ratified by Israel.263
However, under Israeli law it may be argued that the Third Geneva
Convention should not be controlling.264  This could have
important implications when considering what law to apply in re-
evaluating the prisoner of war status of PLOfedayeen.
2. Declaratory Treaties
The Israeli legal system interprets treaties signed by the Israeli
Government as either "declaratory" or "constitutive. ',1 65  A
declaratory treaty is a treaty which codifies international
customary law and its provisions are automatically part of Israeli
domestic law.266  This means that a declaratory treaty is
enforceable in the Israeli Courts by parties affected by the
provisions of the treaty. This stems from the Israeli Supreme
Court decision in Shimshon v. Attorney General2 67 which held that
customary international law is part of Israeli domestic law.268
262 See supra notes 240-61 and accompanying text.
263 See Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR.
L. REv. 451, 478 (1990); Rubin, supra note 255, at 172-73. But if Protocol I was held
to be indicative of customary international law then it could possibly be controlling in
Israeli courts. See infra notes 340-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Protocol I as customary international law.
264 See infra notes 265-307 and accompanying text.
265 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 458-60 (1990); Yaffa Zilbershats, The
Adoption of International Law Into Israeli Law: The Real Is Ideal, 25 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM.
RTs. 243, 24748 (1995).
266 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 458.
267 Shimshon, 17 INT'L L. REP. 72 (1950); see also Lapidoth, supra note 263, at
456-57 (explaining the court's holding).
268 See Shimshon, 17 INT'L L. REP. at 75. The Court has also held, however, that if
there is a contrary Israeli statute, the Israeli statute will prevail over customary
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Therefore, a declaratory treaty is only codifying law which was
already part of the Israeli legal system.
In Abu Aita v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria
Region,"' the Israeli Supreme Court placed the burden of proof in
establishing an international custom on the proponent of that
custom. In addition, in Affu v. Commander of the IDF Forces in
the West Bank,"' the Israeli Supreme Court held that the burden of
proof is even higher than usual when the custom being advanced is
meant to show a "binding rule of the laws of war."'272
3. Constitutive Treaties
In contrast to declaratory treaties, in the Israeli system a
constitutive treaty contains new international law.273 Much like a
non-self executing treaty in the U.S. system, a constitutive treaty
creates binding effects on Israel internationally but not within its
domestic legal system."4 The provisions of a constitutive treaty
only become part of Israeli domestic law upon transformation
through domestic legislation by either the Knesset or by a
Cabinet Minister who has been delegated that power by the
Knesset 76
If private individuals attempt to sue on rights or obligations
created by a treaty which Israel has ratified but which is neither a
codification of international customary law nor has been
transformed, they will fail. 7' This was the result in Custodian of
international law. See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 456-57.
269 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 454 (citing Abu Aita v. Commander of the
Judea & Samaria Region, 37(u) P.D. 197, 7 S.J. 1 (Hebrew, 1983)).
270 See id. at 454-55 (citing Abu Aita, 37(u) P.D. 197, 7 S.J. 1 (Hebrew, 1983)).
271 29 I.L.M 139 (1990); see also Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 455 (explaining the
court's holding).
272 Affu, 29 I.L.M at 163.
273 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 458.
274 See id. at 458-59.
275 The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament. Unlike most parliamentary systems, the
Israeli Prime Minister is directly elected by the Israeli public. The Prime Minister heads
a cabinet whose composition must be approved by the Knesset. See DEP'T OF STATE,
supra note 40.
276 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 460-64.
277 See id. at 458-59.
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Absentee Property v. Samarah,"' where the Israeli Supreme Court
held that private individuals could not sue under the auspices of
the Armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan.279
One author has explained the rationale behind requiring such
transformation this way:
The [p]rimary reason given by the Court in support of the view
that treaties must be enacted into law in order to have force in
domestic Israeli law was the separation of powers. Since the
government is authorized to conclude treaties without the
consent of the Knesset, their direct adoption into domestic law
would, in effect, give legislative power to the executive branch
of the Government.280
4. The Geneva Conventions: Constitutive or Declarative?
In Dwikat v. The Government of Israel, 21 the Israeli Supreme
Court considered a petition by inhabitants of the West Bank
challenging a seizure of land by the military government as a
violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 282 The Court held that
the Fourth Geneva Convention was constitutive and was therefore
not enforceable in Israeli Courts in regard to actions taken by the
military government in the West Bank.283 The Court found instead
that the Hague Convention of 1907 was controlling because, in
contrast to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it was declarative of
customary international law.284 This conclusion that "[t]he Hague
278 22 INT'L L. REP. 5 (1955); see also Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 458-59
(explaining the court's holding).
279 Samarah, 22 INT'L L. REP. at 7.
280 See Zilbershats, supra note 261, at 248. The reaction of one eminent Israeli
legal scholar to the differentiation between declaratory and constitutive treaties should
be noted. Shabtai Rosenne, in a letter to the Israeli Law Review, said: "Such an idea
has no basis in modem public international law nor, so far as I am aware, in that part of
the theory on international law which deals with the relationship between international
law, whether conventional or customary, and domestic law." Shabtai Rosenne,
Communication to the Editor, 15 IsR. L. REv. 463 (1980).
281 See S. Goldstein & D. Schottenfels, Digest: Recent Legislation and Cases, 15
ISR. L. REv. 131 (1980) (citing Dwikat v. The Government of Israel, [not yet
published]).
282 See id. at 131.
283 See id. at 131-32.
284 See id.
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Regulations form part of the domestic law [of Israel], but the
Geneva Convention that deals with the same subjects has no place
in Israeli law' 2 5 has since been followed in a number of cases.286
The holding that the Fourth Geneva Convention is constitutive
under Israeli law raises three related questions. First, is the Third
Geneva Convention also constitutive in nature or is it instead
declaratory? Second, if it is constitutive, would that affect
whether it is held to be the controlling treaty in regard to the
prisoner of war status of PLO fedayeen? Finally, if the Third
Geneva Convention is not the applicable law, what is?
V. Which Law to Apply?
A. Possible Standards to Apply
1. Introduction
There are four possible legal standards which could be applied
to PLO fedayeen: the Hague Convention of 1907, the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949, Protocol I, or an international legal
custom not embodied in those treaties. The Israeli legal system
currently applies the Third Geneva Convention to this issue.2 17 If
the Third Geneva Convention is constitutive, however, it may be
necessary to look to international customary law to find the
appropriate law to apply in re-examining the prisoner of war status
of PLO fedayeen.2 ' This custom may be in the form of either of
285 Zilbershats, supra note 265, at 251.
286 See id. at 248-53.
287 See supra notes 240-61 and accompanying text.
28 The results of this inquiry would only be relevant in regard to a lawsuit brought
within the Israeli legal system by individual PLO fedayeen. This is because the
constitutive nature of a treaty only prevents it from being applied internally as Israeli
domestic law. Such a treaty, however, still creates binding international obligations on
Israel. Therefore, if suit were brought before the International Court of Justice the Third
Geneva Convention would probably control. This is because Israel is a party to the
Third Geneva Convention and the PLO has made an attempted accession to the Third
Geneva Convention. This attempted accession was done by notifying the Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs of their intent to adhere to the convention. See ICRC,
supra note 224. The Swiss Federal Council has stated that it is unable to rule on the
validity of this accession because of the "uncertainty" over the issue of Palestinian
statehood. See id. Also see infra notes 438-48 and accompanying text (for a discussion
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the other two treaties or some other custom not yet embodied in a
treaty. The results of any re-examination of the prisoner of war
status of PLO fedayeen by the Israeli Courts or the International
Court of Justice depends on which of these bodies of law
controls."9
2. The Hague Convention of 1907
By holding in Dwikat that the Hague Convention of 1907 was
declaratory, the Israeli Supreme Court explicitly found that it
embodied customary international law.2 90 The Nuremberg Tribunal
following World War II also came to this result.29" ' Therefore, the
Hague Convention is enforceable under Israeli domestic law and
would be applicable unless superseded.
The Hague Convention's requirements for privileged
combatant status are in some ways stricter than those applied by
the Israeli courts in Kassem and Abu Kabar, because it does not
explicitly include resistance movements among those who are
eligible for privileged combatant status.2 92 The Israeli courts have
held that the PLO failed to meet the four criteria set out in Article
4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention. These criteria are also
present in the Hague Convention of 1907.293 Therefore, re-
examining fedayeen status under the Hague Convention would
produce the same results as doing so under the Geneva
Convention.
3. The Third Geneva Convention
The Third Geneva Convention is the standard which has been
of the possible forums in which suit could be brought).
289 As already noted in supra note 288, any suit brought before the International
Court of Justice would likely be decided under the standards set out in the Third Geneva
Convention.
290 See Goldenstein & Schottenfels, supra note 281, at 131.
291 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
293 Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 195, at 2295-96. It should be noted,
however, that the Hague Convention of 1907 does not contain the explicit requirement
of "belonging" to a Party to the conflict. Id. The analysis made in infra notes 315-18 and
accompanying text that such status can be applied retroactively diminishes the
importance of this.
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applied by Israeli courts in determining the prisoner of war status
of PLO fedayeen. In the Kassem and Abu Bakar cases, the Israeli
courts held that the PLO had not met the criteria of Article 4A of
that treaty. 94
While whether the PLO has ever been a "Party to the conflict"
may be debated, there is little question that in the past the PLO did
not meet the criteria of Article 4A.295 Because of this, any re-
examination of prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva
Convention must focus on whether privileged combatancy can be
granted retroactively to combatants denied prisoner of war status.
This would require that the PLO's failure to meet Article 4A
criteria in the past could be annulled by current conditions.296
4. Protocol I
Because Israel is not a signatory to Protocol I, there is little
possibility that an Israeli court or the International Court of Justice
would find this treaty to be controlling. But if Protocol I were held
to codify customary international law which has superseded the
Third Geneva Convention then, because Israeli law incorporates
customary international law,297 Protocol I could be controlling.298
5. International Custom
It is also possible that a custom of international law, not
codified in any treaty, may be controlling in this situation. Such a
custom would have to relate to the treatment members of a
resistance or liberation movement initially denied prisoner of war
status should receive if the movement is subsequently granted
recognition by the opposing state.299
294 See supra notes 242-54 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 111-39 and accompanying text (detailing indiscriminate PLO
attacks upon civilian targets).
296 See infra notes 308-39 and accompanying text (discussing the retroactivity of
privileged combatancy).
297 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
298 See infra notes 340-46 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that
Protocol I controls).
299 See infra notes 347-428 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of a
customary international law on prisoner of war status).
1997]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
B. Does the Third Geneva Convention Apply?
1. Constitutive or Declaratory?
While Israel refuses to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to
disputes in the West Bank,3"' it uses the Third Geneva Convention
to decide the prisoner of war status of PLOfedayeen.°' This could
be based on a number of factors. It could be possible that while
the Fourth Geneva Convention is constitutive, the Third Geneva
Convention is declaratory. This is entirely possible given that the
Third Geneva Convention is largely repetitive of the provisions of
the Hague Convention, which the Israeli Supreme Court has held
is declaratory.3 2 However, the Third Geneva Convention does
differ from the Hague Convention in its inclusion of resistance
movements as privileged combatants." 3 This could lead to the
argument that the Third Geneva Convention, through the
expansion of privileged combatancy to resistance movements, has
created new law and is therefore constitutive. 3
Even if the Third Geneva Convention was constitutive at its
creation it can be argued that its almost universal acceptance
shows that is has become customary international law.30 5 If so, the
Third Geneva Convention controls because of its declarative
nature, and the question of the retroactive application of privileged
combatancy arises. This issue of retroactivity will be discussed in
the following section.3 6
If it is constitutive, because the Third Geneva Convention, like
300 See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 240-61 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 217-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Geneva
Convention and the post World War II push to expand privileged combatancy).
305 There are 188 parties to the Third Geneva Convention. See ICRC, supra note
224. In comparison, there are 185 member states in the United Nations. See id. This
argument is weakened by the Israeli Supreme Court's decision that the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which is as universally accepted as the Third Geneva Convention, is
constitutive. See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying test (discussing the Israeli
Supreme Court decision to declare the Fourth Geneva Convention constitutive).
306 See infra notes 308-39 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Geneva Convention, has not been transformed by the
Knesset, it should not be controlling in Israeli courts. Rather,
Israeli courts should apply customary international law. The
question would then be whether to look for customary
international law in either the Hague Convention, Protocol I, or a
custom not yet codified in a treaty.3"7
If the Hague Convention controls, the questions over the
retroactivity of privileged combatancy discussed in the next
section are relevant. This is because the texts of the Third Geneva
Convention and the Hague Convention are almost identical in
regard to prisoners of war. Therefore, a re-examination under the
Hague Convention would produce the same results as one under
the Third Geneva Convention.
It is possible, however, that international custom has been
extended beyond the Hague Convention and is now embodied in
Protocol I or a yet uncodified custom. This possibility will be
examined in Section C and D of Part IV.
2. Is the Third Geneva Convention Retroactive?
If the Third Geneva Convention is declaratory or if the
provisions of the Hague Convention are controlling, changing the
prisoner of war status of PLO fedayeen would require that
privileged combatancy be applied retroactively. While there is
little weight in the argument that the PLO met the criteria of
Article 4A in the past, it can be argued that they meet its criteria
today. These requirements should be broken down into two parts:
1) being a "Party to the conflict," and 2) meeting the four
enumerated requirements of Article 4A(2)." 8
In 1988, the PLO declared the existence of the Palestinian
307 See infra notes 340-428 and accompanying text.
308 1 am using Article 4A(2)'s four criteria because the armed forces of the
Palestinian Authority, over 30,000 men under arms organized into roughly ten or more
separate para-military units, are more characteristic of militia units than the regular
armed forces of a state. This is because these units are organized as police/security
units, not exclusive combat units. See Graham Usher, Palestinian Authority, Israeli
Rule, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1996, at 15, 16. Whether the Palestinian Authority's forces
are considered militia or members of the armed forces, they still must fulfill Article
4A(2)'s four criteria.
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State.3 That "state" has an elected government, the Palestinian
Authority headed by Yasser Arafat, and is in control of definite
territory, most of the Gaza Strip and almost a quarter of the West
Bank.3"' Certain issues over final borders have yet to be worked
out with Israel, but the beginnings of a state now exist."' This
should be enough to meet the minimum threshold necessary to be
a "Party to the conflict."
The PLO's military force also meets the four enumerated
criteria of Article 4A(2). The Palestinian Police Forces, which are
largely made up of Fatah and other PLO fedayeen, are arguably
"commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates." This
is based on the fact that these forces are subordinate to
commanders who are under the authority of the Palestinian
Authority.3"2 They have uniforms, fulfilling the need to "have a
fixed distinctive sign" and they "carry their arms openly." '3t3
Whether they are "conducting their operations in accordance with
the law of war" is a difficult question because the Palestinian
Authority is not currently involved in any official hostilities. If
obeying the laws of war is assumed, an overall conclusion could
be made that, with the transformation of the PLO's guerrilla army
into the rudiments of a state police force, the four requirements of
Article 4A(2) have been met.314
If the PLO now meets the Third Geneva Convention's criteria
for privileged combatancy, it would still be necessary that the
PLO's current status be effective retroactively for PLOfedayeen in
Israeli jails to receive any benefits. The Third Geneva Convention
makes no mention of retroactively granting privileged
309 See Isabel Kershner, The Nation-Builders, JERUSALEM REPORT, Dec. 12, 1996, at
24.
310 See Bruck, supra note 1, at 76-82.
311 See infra notes 446-48 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria Palestine
must meet to achieve statehood).
312 See Bruck, supra note 1, at 80-82.
313 Id.; Usher, supra note 308, at 15-18.
314 Because the Palestinian Authority has established a police force instead of an
official army, it is useful to analyze them in terms of a "militia." See Usher, supra note
308, at 16.
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combatancy. However, an analogy with Underhill v. Hernandez,"'
an early United States Act of State Doctrine case, can be made to
show how privileged combatancy could be retroactive. In that
case, the United States Supreme Court held that the actions of a
Venezuelan rebel army were clothed in the authority of the
Venezuelan state once the rebel army took power. On the
principle of retroactive application, the Court said, "It is idle to
argue that the proceedings of those who thus triumphed should be
treated as the acts of banditti, or mere mobs." '316
This case could form the basis of a useful analogy if the only
basis for denying privileged combatancy had been the PLO not
being a "Party to the conflict."3 "' But in Kassem, the court held that
even if the defendants were under the authority of a "Party to the
conflict" they would still be denied privileged combatant status
because of their failure to meet the Article 4A(2)'s four
requirements."'
The Mohamed Ali case, which was relied on in Abu Kabar,1 9
supports the position that a failure to meet Article 4A(2)'s four
requirements cannot be negated by vicariously clothing
combatants with the status of others.3 2  In Mohamed Ali, the
Singapore government tried and eventually hung, two Indonesian
soldiers who had carried out a bomb attack in Singapore. 321 The
attack was targeted against civilians and the soldiers were dressed
in civilian clothing.322 On appeal, the British Privy Council held
315 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
316 Id. at 253.
317 The precedential value of this case depends greatly upon where suit is brought.
If suit is brought before the Israeli Supreme Court, Israeli Justices would have little
incentive to rely on United States Supreme Court opinions. The International Court of
Justice's Charter, however, explicitly allows for the Court to base its holdings on the
opinions of the highest courts in the United Nations member states. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1179, at art 38(l)(d).
318 See Shapiro-Libai, supra note 242, at 459-60.
319 See Domb, supra note 251, at 266-67.
320 See id.
321 See R.R. Baxter, The Privy Council on the Qualifications of Belligerents, 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 290, 294-96 (1969).
322 See id. at 294.
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that even regular army soldiers acting under the sovereign
authority of a state must still meet the four enumerated criteria of
Article 4A(2) lest they be denied the benefits of privileged
combatancy.323 The United States Supreme Court held similarly in
Ex Parte Quirin,324 when it refused to grant writs of habeas corpus
to seven Nazi saboteurs who infiltrated the United States during
World War 11.325 There the Court relied on the Hague Convention's
definition of privileged combatancy when it held that combatants
who donned civilian dress gave up any rights to prisoner of war
status.
326
These two cases show that even if fedayeen actions could be
retroactively clothed with the authority of the Palestinian
Authority, fedayeen failures to meet the four enumerated criteria of
Article 4A(2) would prevent them from receiving privileged
combatant status.327  Both the Malaysian Army and the German
Army clearly met all the four enumerated criteria of Article 4A(2)
at the time of the two incidents, but the failure of the individual
defendants in Mohammed Ali and Ex Parte Quirin to meet that
criteria deprived those defendants of privileged combatant status.328
If the status of the main body of an army cannot be used to
vicariously clothe members not meeting Article 4A(2)'s four
requirements then the status of a liberation movement years after
the event should not retroactively clothe its members with
privileged combatant status.3 9 For that reason, PLO fedayeen who
failed to meet Article 4A(2)'s four criteria in the past cannot
expect any benefits from a change in the PLO's status.
If being a "Party to the conflict" is applied retroactively,
323 See Mohamed Ali v. Public Prosecutor, 3 All E.R. 488, 497 (1968).
324 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
325 See id. at 48.
326 See id. at 30-36.
327 Only privileged combatants are due prisoner of war status upon capture. Other
combatants are considered illegal combatants and are subject to criminal sanctions. See
supra notes 177-203 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
329 See supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that all
four criteria must be met by the movement while individual combatants must themselves
wear a distinctive sign, carry arms openly and follow the laws of war).
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however, then PLO fedayeen who were captured and did meet
Article 4A(2)'s four enumerated requirements might arguably be
granted prisoner of war status retroactively. In Kassem, the Court
held that the PFLP's failure to meet Article 4A(2)'s four
enumerated criteria would be applied to all of its members, even if
they individually met Article 4A(2)'s four criteria when
captured.33 ° But would later compliance with those criteria by the
movement clothe these members who themselves had followed
them? An analogy with the criminal law on justifications and
excuses leads to the conclusion that this later compliance is
insufficient to protect even these members of the PLO.
In the criminal law, a party who takes an action which in most
circumstances is a crime may be found not guilty if certain
circumstances existed at the time of the event."' One such
circumstance is mental illness. If a defendant was insane at the
time of the crime, he would ordinarily not be held responsible.332
But if the person becomes insane after having committed the
crime, his mental illness cannot be retroactively applied to find
him not guilty of the act taken while sane.333 By analogy, a
combatant would only be excused for his actions if he were acting
as a privileged combatant at the time the action took place.3
Therefore, a retroactive extension of privileged combatancy to the
330 See Shapiro-Libai, supra note 242, at 460. This analysis of Article 4A(2) has
also been made by Draper and Mallison and Mallison See Draper, supra note 222, at
196; Mallison & Mallison, supra note 181, at 62-63.
331 See ARIEL BIN-NUN, THE LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: AN INTRODUCTION 11l-
13 (1992); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 182-97 (1995)
(explaining the law on justifications and excuses).
332 See BIN-NUN, supra note 331, at 111-13; see also DRESSLER, supra note 331, at
309-32 (explaining the law on insanity).
333 See DRESSLER, supra note 331, at 310-11. The result of such an occurrence
would be to make the defendant incompetent to stand trial until they regained their
competency. See id. Similarly, becoming mentally incompetent after having been
found guilty would not negate the conviction.
334 Another useful analogy may be made to the justification of "public authority"
which shields many of the actions of police officers which would otherwise be criminal.
See id. at 249-60. Such a justification could not shield the actions of an officer which
occurred outside the course of his employment or which occurred prior to joining the
police force.
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combatant would be unavailable.335
While being a "Party to the conflict" may arguably be
retroactive based on an analogy with Underhill,36 the same cannot
so readily be said of meeting Article 4A(2)'s four criteria. Both
the holdings in Mohamed Ali337 and Ex Parte Quirin338 make it
doubtful that privileged combatancy may be applied retroactively
to those who have failed to meet Article 4A(2)'s criteria.
Similarly, the criminal law on justifications and excuses shows
that privileged combatancy in general should not be applied
retroactively to any combatants.339
C. Should Protocol I Apply?
Protocol I has not been signed by Israel and the Israeli
government has repeatedly voiced its refusal to accept it as
international law.40 Therefore, Protocol I could only be
controlling if the Third Geneva Convention were held to be
constitutive and the Israeli Supreme Court held that Protocol I
embodied customary international law in this area. As customary
international law it would then be integrated into Israeli domestic
law.34' For Protocol I to be binding in a suit brought before the
International Court of Justice, the Court would have to hold that
Protocol I had become customary international law which has
superseded the Third Geneva Convention in regard to states which
are not a party to it.
The argument that Protocol I has become customary
international law has been discussed by Benjamin Rubin, a former
Special Assistant to Israel's Attorney General, who has said:
335 This analogy would of course be applied to the retroactivity of privileged
combatancy in general, not just to combatants who had individually met Article 4A(2)'s
four criteria.
336 See supra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
337 See supra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
340 See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
341 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at 452. This integration would also require the
Court to hold that Israel has not been a constant objector to such a custom, which is
doubtful.
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The possibility that this Article will gain anything approaching
general adherence is not even worth considering. Moreover,
even if this provision should become customary international
law, it will still not be binding upon Israel, since Israel objected
to it from the outset and made its objections clear during the
Diplomatic Conference of 1977. 42
If for some reason Protocol I was controlling, its expansion of
privileged combatancy would give PLO fedayeen prisoner of war
status. Not only does Article 1(4) say that Protocol I applies to
"liberation movements, '  Protocol I also has few criteria to
restrict granting privileged combatancy.44 The commentary on
Protocol I shows that the drafters' intentions were to implicitly
grant privileged combatancy to the PLO.345 Because of its clear
language and the intent of the drafters, prisoner of war status
would have to be granted to PLO fedayeen under Protocol V31
D. Is There an International Custom on Prisoners of War?
1. Customary International Law
Customary international law is law founded on the customs of
states. As one writer has noted, "Customary rules crystallize from
usages or practices which have evolved in approximately three sets
of circumstances: (a) Diplomatic relations between states . . .
(b) Practice of international organs . . . and (c) State laws,
decisions of state courts, and state military or administrative
practices. 347  Customary international law is therefore a
combination of both the practices of states in certain areas and the
expectation of the international community that these practices
will continue.
If there is international custom controlling this issue, it would
342 Rubin, supra note 255, at 172-73 n.12.
343 See Protocol I, supra note 195, at 1397.
344 See supra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
345 See Douglas J. Feith, Protocol : Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19
AKRON L. REv. 531-35 (1986); see also Fenrick, supra note 231, at 113.
34 See Feith, supra note 345, at 531-35. But see Howard S. Levie, Prisoners Of
War Under The 1977 Protocol 1, 23 AKRON L. REv. 55-72 (1989).
347 J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37 (1989).
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have to be demonstrated by examining the past treatment of
liberation movements. The central question is whether jailed
guerrillas and revolutionaries have been granted prisoner of war
status after the movement to which they belonged to was granted
recognition. The following case studies demonstrate that such a
practice may exist.
a) Britain and Irish Independence: 1916-1922
In April 1916, Irish Catholic "Volunteers" began an armed
uprising against the British presence in Ireland.3 While the
majority of the Irish population favored political separation from
Britain, the Volunteers were among the few who favored the use
of violence to free Ireland from British control and form an Irish
Republic.3 49
Fighting soon broke out throughout Dublin and in parts of the
countryside."' The Volunteers attempted to fight a conventional
battle with the British."' Outnumbered in men and weapons, the
Volunteers were defeated within a week. Of those not killed in the
fighting, the British executed sixteen and sentenced the rest to hard
labor in English prisons.352
Demands for prisoner of war status for those taking part in the
uprising were refused."3  Eventually the poor treatment of the
prisoners led to political pressure on Britain from the United
States. This in turn led to the declaration of amnesty in December
1916, freeing most of those who had taken part in the Uprising.354
The rest of the prisoners were released in June 1917.355
In the years following their release, the Volunteers adopted a
new form of warfare under the tutelage of Michael Collins, 356 a
348 See TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA: A HISTORY 14 (1993).
349 See id. at 14-16.
350 See id.
351 See id.
352 See TIM PAT COOGAN, THE MAN WHO MADE IRELAND: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF
MICHAEL COLLINS 45-46 (1992).
353 See id. at 55-56.
354 See id at 57, 59-60.
355 See id. at 67.
356 See id. at xi, 94.
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leader in the uprising who had avoided execution by
happenstance."'1 The Volunteers' new tactics were the foundation
of what was to become modem urban guerrilla warfare.358
Ambushes of British soldiers and police were the most common
tactics, complemented by the assassination of suspected British
spies and informers to cut off the flow of intelligence to the
British.359
Full scale urban warfare broke out in 1 920.2" The year before,
Collins had formed his "Squad," a team of assassins carrying out
attacks on the British police system.36 The effectiveness of the
"Squad" and other Volunteer actions led to an increase in British
forces throughout Ireland, which in turn escalated the conflict.
36 2
Murder and counter-murder were the rule, not the exception.363
Volunteers who were captured could expect torture or
summary execution.3" Prisoner of war status was not granted to
Volunteers.365  Many Volunteers who were captured were
prosecuted and sentenced to death.3" In response to this denial of
prisoner of war status, Volunteers held in Mountjoy Prison went
367
on a hunger strike, demanding release or prisoner of war status.
The prisoners were only released after English Labour leaders
called a strike in support of the prisoners.3 8 A second hunger
strike at Wormwood Scrubs Prison produced similar results.36 9
While this tactic worked at first, later hunger strikes failed to
produce concessions.37°
311 See id. at 46.
358 See id. at xi-xii.
319 See id. at 116-18, 140.
361 See id. at 122, 140.
361 See id. at 116-18.
362 See id. at 122-27.
363 See id. at 132-34, 140-44.
364 See id. at 134, 145-47.
365 See id. at 140.
361 See id. at 179.
367 See id. at 139.
368 See id.
369 See id. at 139-40.
370 See id. at 155.
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As a result of the toll the war was taking on British prestige
and its effects domestically the British government entered into
peace negotiations with the Volunteers. The treaty which followed
established an Irish Republic in all of Ireland except for six
counties in the north whose populations were largely Protestant
and loyal to Britain. British military units in southern Ireland were
quickly evacuated after the ratification of the treaty.37' The treaty
did not end the violence in Ireland. A Civil War broke out among
the Republicans over the treaty, and sectarian violence in the six
northern counties continues to this day. It did result, however, in
the release of political prisoners arrested prior to its signing.72
b) Britain and the Palestine Mandate
During the British Mandate in Palestine, the Jewish
community was divided into three factions. The Yishuv and its
military arm, the Haganah, represented the majority of the
population. The Yishuv and Haganah were socialist in orientation
and favored compromise and working with the British during
World War II to help secure a Jewish Homeland.373 Opposed to the
Yishuv's method of compromise were the Irgun, led by future
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin,374 and LEHI, which was
also known as the Stem Gang. These two groups represented non-
socialist Zionism and were unwilling to compromise with the
British, favoring the use of violence as a catalyst for change. 75
In January 1944, the Irgun declared a revolt against the
British.376 The revolt began with the firebombing of government
offices and shoot-outs with British police.377 From there the
activities of the Irgun escalated, following the path of LEHI which
had been engaged in attacks on the British since its foundation as a
371 See JOSEPH M. CURRAN, THE BIRTH OF THE IRISH FREE STATE 1921-1923, at 160-
61(1980).
372 See COOGAN, supra note 352, at 355.
373 See J. BOWYER BELL, ON REVOLT 37 (1976) [hereinafter BELL, ON REVOLT].
374 See id. at 38.
375 See id. at 37-38.
376 See id.
377 See id. at 45-46.
[Vol. 22
POW STATUS OF PLO FEDA YEEN
splinter group of the Irgun.378 The Yishuv feared that terrorist
actions by the Irgun and LEHI would lead to reprisals against the
whole Jewish community in the Mandate. Thus, the Yishuv
cooperated with the British against the two groups and in
particular against the more numerous Irgun. This was the
beginning of what became known as the "Season." '379 Yishuv
cooperation was limited at first to small scale kidnappings of Irgun
men. After LEHI assassinated the British Minister of State in the
Middle East, Lord Moyne, however, Yishuv cooperation was
expanded,38 leading to the arrests of hundreds of Irgun members. 1
This alliance lasted only a few months and when World War II
ended, the Haganah, the Irgun, and LEHI formed a short-lived
united front against the British."2 The united front evaporated
when the Yishuv returned to negotiations and the Irgun and LEHI
continued the revolt. Martial law was eventually declared.3.83
Members of the Irgun who were captured could expect to be
tried as criminals, possibly facing death sentences.384 Many Jews
arrested by the British were deported to Eritrea.385 After two Irgun
members were sentenced to flogging, the Irgun kidnapped three
British officers and flogged them in retaliation.386 This soon ended
the British practice of flogging prisoners. 7 Likewise, the Irgun
hanged two British police officers in response to the hanging of
three Irgun men captured in a raid on a British prison."'
This and other pressures led the British to turn the problem of
the Palestine Mandate over to the newly formed United Nations.389
378 See id. at 40.
319 See id. at 49.
380 See id. at 49-50.
381 See id. at 51.
382 See id. at 55.
383 See id. at 63.
38 See id. at 63-64; J. BOWYER BELL, TERROR OUT OF ZION 197-99 (1977)
[hereinafter BELL, TERROR].
38 See BELL, TERROR, supra note 384, at 125, 178.
386 See BELL, ON REVOLT, supra note 373, at 61.
387 See id.
388 See BELL, TERROR, supra note 384, at 227-28, 235-38.
389 See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
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The United Nations voted for partition,'" and the British began
their withdrawal. After the British presence in Palestine was
ended, the remaining Jewish prisoners were freed.39" ' In July 1948,
the deportees in Eritrea were returned to Israel by the British ship
Ocean Vigour.3 92 Many of the men who had been considered
wanted terrorists by the British and who were at one time hounded
by the Yishuv went on to enter mainstream Israeli politics.3 93
Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun, became the Israeli
Prime Minister from 1977-1983. 94 One of his successors as prime
minister was Yitzak Shamir, a leader in LEHI who had been
deported to Eritrea.39 While denied prisoner of war status during
the revolt, those who were captured and not executed were
eventually freed. Even those tried in foreign countries for actions
taken outside the Palestine Mandate were returned to Israel by
1950.396
c) France and Algeria
In 1954, France was drawn into war in Algeria by a liberation
movement seeking to free Algeria from French rule.39 The
Algerian Liberation Front fought the French until 1962, when the
French agreed to allow an Algerian election on self-
determination.398
During the eight years of fighting, the French did not grant
official prisoner of war status to Algerian prisoners. Some authors
have noted, however, that French treatment of prisoners "on a de
facto basis tended to bring the status of captured Algerian
combatants close to that of prisoners of war."3  While the French
did not bring criminal charges against all FLN members, those
390 See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
391 See BELL, TERROR, supra note 384, at 343-44.
392 See id.
393 See id.
394 See QUANDT, supra note 74, at 261, 349.
391 See BELL, TERROR, supra note 384, at 167.
396 See id. at 343.
397 See ROSAS, supra note 177, at 146.
398 See id.
399 Id. at 149.
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accused of terrorist acts were charged, and sometimes executed.4
Those that were not tried in French courts were detained in
military camps.
The French treatment of Algerian prisoners seems to have
occurred in two phases. Maltreatment of Algerian prisoners was
the norm in the first years of the war, and many prisoners were
summarily executed or sentenced to death by the French legal
system. But as the war progressed, the French stance on
executions softened, possibly, as one author noted, "to calm down
internal and international criticism and to increase the inclination
of the enemy troops to surrender. '"' While the maltreatment of
prisoners also lessened, torture was still used at times for the
purpose of gathering information402
Negotiations between the FLN and the French Government
began in the early 1960s, culminating with the French concession
to Algerian demands for self-determination. This agreement
between the FLN and the French government led to the release of
"all prisoners of both sides taken in combat," even though prisoner
of war status had not been granted.403
d) South Africa and the African National Congress
Until 1994, the government of South Africa was controlled by
that country's white minority population.40 Many groups formed
in opposition to this system of racial domination. Chief among
these was the African National Congress, founded in 1912.45 The
ANC changed over time from a group representing the black
middle class to one advocating the violent overthrow of the South
African system.4
The military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of
400 See id.
401 Id. at 149-50.
402 See id. at 150-51.
403 Id. at 148.
404 See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK To FREEDOM 535-40 (1994).
405 See MORGAN NORVAL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: THE ANC's WAR ON SOUTH
AFRICA 21 (1993).
4 See ROBERT M. PRICE, THE APARTHEID STATE IN CRISIS: POLITICAL
TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1975-1990 17 (1991).
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the Nation) engaged in attacks against the South African state,
with civilians often being caught in the crossfire.47 To avoid the
internal security measures taken by the South African state, many
of Umkhonto we Sizwe's forces were eventually based and trained
in neighboring states.48 During the mid-1980s the level of unrest
and violence in South Africa escalated.4 A state of emergency
was declared in the black townships where much of the state's
black population had been segregated.1 °
During this period, the level of violence was astronomical.
Violent retributions were carried out against people believed to be
government informers and there have been many allegations that
the South African police force operated unofficial and official hit
squads. 41' ANC members who were arrested during this period
were denied prisoner of war status, facing imprisonment or
execution. 2
Eventually, the white minority government in South Africa
entered into negotiations with the ANC 3.41  These negotiations
resulted in an agreement which led to the creation of a
democratically elected government.414 Nelson Mandela, a former
prisoner and leader of the ANC, was elected as president of the
New South African state.45 As part of the process, prisoners held
for political crimes were released and amnesty was granted to
those wanted for political crimes committed in the past.4
6
407 See NORVAL, supra note 405, at 26-36.
408 See MANDELA, supra note 404, at 250, 382-83.
409 See PRICE, supra note 406, at 190-217.
410 See id. at 249-5 1.
41 See Raymond W. Copson, South Africa: Background, Current Issues, U.S.
Policy, CONG. RES. SERVICE: REP. FOR CONGRESS, June 123, 1996, at 17-18; Judith
Matloff, South Africa Starts Healing of its Past, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 5039773.
412 See MANDELA, supra note 404, at 271-330 (describing the Rivonia Trial where
Nelson Mandela and others were sentenced to life in prison for their part in Umkhono we
Sizwe activities).
413 See PRICE, supra note 406, at 251-81.
414 See Mandela, supra note 404, at 531-40.
415 See id. at 540-41.
416 See Copson, supra note 411; Matloff, supra note 411.
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e) Portugal in the Congo
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Portugal fought against
several liberation movements in its African colonies of Angola,
Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.4' The Portuguese government
denied prisoner of war status to members of the various liberation
movements.41 8  Treatment of prisoners by the Portuguese was
reportedly harsh.4 9  The Portuguese came down severely on
combatants who did not distinguish themselves from the civilian
populace. The following was allegedly a Portuguese statement of
policy:
According to military practice, a fighting man who is captured
out of uniform should be shot. It is important to take prisoners,
for they can give useful information; it is for that reason that
they should not be shot immediately .... The prisoner must be
given the opportunity to speak voluntarily but should he refuse
to do so, more efficient methods must be adopted that will
rapidly persuade him to co-operate. After that, he will be shot in
accordance with military practice, given the fact that he is a
fighting man out of uniform.420
In 1974, a change in the Portuguese government led to
negotiations with the liberation movements.42 ' This ultimately led
to the independence of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and
Mozambique,422 and the release of prisoners captured by both sides
423during the wars.
411 See ROSAS, supra note 177, at 160.
418 See id. at 162-63.
419 See id. at 163. One U.N. report stated:
Captured freedom fighters and families of freedom fighters are subjected to
brutal, inhuman and savage methods of torture. Examples are: the captured men
are maimed and forced to eat parts of their bodies. Their wives are raped in
their presence and killed. Aged parents are tortured and murdered and their
flesh is offered as food.
Id. (quoting from the 1970 Report of the U.N. Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1 111, pp. 149-50).
420 Id. at 164 (quoting from the 1970 report of the UN Ad Hoc Working Group of
Experts, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1020/Add. 1, pp. 56-57 (para. 169)).
421 See id. at 160, 163.
422 See id. at 160.
423 See id. at 163.
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2. Has a Custom Been Shown?
These case studies demonstrate a reluctance to grant formal
prisoner of war status to liberation movements during wartime.
There does seems to be a custom, however, of releasing guerrillas
during and after political negotiations leading up to a peace
agreement. These releases occurred in a political, not legal,
context, with the prisoners largely being used as bargaining chips.
Rarely have these actions been phrased in terms of the rights owed
to prisoners of war.424
Regardless, these cases do seem to show a de facto recognition
of the principle that combatants should be released once hostilities
are over. As in other aspects of international relations, countries
seem to be saying one thing while doing another. In analyzing the
customs of states, actions rather than words are important.
Therefore, an argument can be made that an international custom
exists requiring the release of members of liberation movements
when and if a political settlement is concluded.
Proving such a custom in an Israeli court of law would be a
heavy burden. While the Shimshon case has held that customary
international law is part of Israeli domestic law,425 the Abu Aita
case places the burden of proof on the proponent of the custom,
426
while Affu increased the burden of proof when the custom to be
shown is a rule on the laws of war.4 1' Further, because Israel has
consistently objected to Protocol I and its expansion of prisoner of
war status, it can be argued that it should be considered a
consistent objector to such a custom and thus should not be bound
by it. Israel's unwavering application of the Third Geneva
Convention to prisoner of war status is also relevant. By
consistently basing their legal decisions on that treaty, Israel
reiterates its rejection of any opposing criteria. Through such a
424 This will affect whether or not these practices can be said to create an
expectation of similar conduct in the future. Since many of these releases occurred as
the result of organized negotiations, it can be argued that just like with any bargaining
chip, there is no legal requirement that other states must relent on the issue.
423 See Shimshon, 17 INT'L L. REP. 72, 75 (1950).
426 See Lapidoth, supra note 263, at at 454 (citing Abu Aita v. Commander of the
Judea and Samaria Region, 37(ii) P.D. 197, 7 S.J. I (Hebrew, 1983)).
427 29 I.L.M at 163.
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rejection, Israel strengthens its position as a consistent objector to
any such custom.4 8
VI. War Crimes by Privileged Combatants and Others
Perhaps the greatest factor weighing against the release of all
PLO fedayeen is the nature of PLO tactics in the past.4 9 Even if it
is effectively argued that PLO fedayeen deserve prisoner of war
status, many would still face criminal liability for their past
actions. While privileged combatants are not normally tried for
their actions during hostilities, they can be tried for actions which
430fall under the rubric of war crimes.
Many of the tactics used by the PLO in the past fall in to such
a category.43' These tactics have included the taking of civilian
hostages and the intentional killing of civilians.4 2 As the court in
Kassem said about PFLP actions:
The attack upon civilian objectives and the murder of civilians
in the Mahane Yehuda Market in Jerusalem, the Night of the
Grenades in Jerusalem, the placing of grenades and destructive
charges in the Tel Aviv Central Bus Station, etc., were all
428 These same arguments can also be applied to any contentions before the
International Court of Justice that Israel should be bound by such a custom.
429 See supra notes 111-39 and accompanying text.
430 The Third Geneva Convention allows for the trial of war criminals even if they
are prisoners of war. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 195, at 3392-400.
Protocol I also contains supplementary material on prosecuting the laws of war. See
Protocol I, supra note 195, at 1427-31; see also Solf& Cummings, supra note 181, at
225-29 (describing attacks on civilian targets as both violations of customary
international law and Protocol I); see generally R.R. Baxter, The Municipal and
International Law Basis of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 382
(1951) (examining different procedures used to prosecute war crimes in the aftermath of
World War II and distinguishing the denial of privileged combatancy from prosecution
for war crimes).
431 See Louis Renae Beres, International Law Requires Prosecution, Not
Celebration, Of Arafat, 71 U. DET. MERCY. L. REV. 569 (1994) (discussing PLO tactics
and criminal culpability for them); see generally NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE & DAVID
HALEVY, INSIDE THE PLO: COVERT UNITS, SECRET FUNDS, AND THE WAR AGAINST
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 94-137 (1990) (describing PLO covert units and
terrorist tactics). Protocol I expressly forbids targeting civilian populaces. Protocol I,
supra note 195, at 1413-14 and 1427-28.
432 See generally LIVINGSTONE & HALEVY, supra note 431, at 94-137 (describing
PLO tactics). For a description of PLO tactics, see supra notes 111-39 and
accompanying text.
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wanton acts of terrorism aimed at men, women, and children
who were certainly not lawful military objectives. They are
utterly repugnant to the principles of international law, and
according to the authorities quoted are crimes for which their
perpetrators must pay the penalty. Immunity of non-combatants
from direct attack is one of the basic rules of the international
law of war.4"
International law on this subject has been clear: Combatants
can be tried for crimes against the laws of war. This was applied
during the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials34 and during the trials of
Japanese war criminals.4 ' This has also been the case in the recent
trials held by the War Crimes Tribunal investigating crimes in the
former state of Yugoslavia.
This means that even if PLOfedayeen were granted prisoner of
war status, those who have been tried for acts which amount to
war crimes would not be eligible for release. They would have to
serve out there sentences unless amnesty was granted them by the
Israeli government.4 6 Because of the nature of PLO tactics a large
percentage of those who remain is Israeli prisons could likely be
considered war criminals.
433 Kassem, 42 INT'L L. REP. at 483.
434 See Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, Oct. 14, 1945-Oct 1, 1946 (1947-1949); Christian Tomushcat,
International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg Confirmed, in THE
PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 17, 17-27 (Roger S. Clark & Madeleine Sann
eds., 1996); see generally Baxter, supra note 430 (describing the war crimes trials
following World War II).
435 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1946); see generally Baxter, supra note
430 (describing the war crimes trials following World War II).
436 Such an amnesty would be solely at the discretion of the Israeli government.
This would raise the interesting question of whether PLO fedayeen released by Israel
could be prosecuted by other states for any war crimes they had committed. This
question arises because universal jurisdiction exists for the prosecution of war crimes,
which means third party states can prosecute war crimes neither committed against their
nationals nor on their territory. See Baxter, supra note 430, at 390-393. Similarly,
Article 86 of Protocol I calls for not only the Parties to a conflict to repress breaches of
the laws of war, it also calls for all the High Contracting Parties to Protocol I to do so.
See Protocol I, supra note 195, at 1428.
437 See generally LIvINGSTONE & HALEVY, supra note 431, at 94-137 (describing
PLO tactics). For a description of PLO tactics, see supra notes 111-39 and
accompanying text.
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VII. What Forum Can Hear This Issue?
Two options exist for bringing suit to challenge the current
legal status of PLO fedayeen. Under the first option, PLO
fedayeen could personally appeal their status to the Israeli
Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear
such an appeal under its authority to sit as a High Court of Justice.
Sitting as a High Court of Justice, the Supreme Court has the
authority to "order the release of person[s] unlawfully detained or
imprisoned.' '3 Such an appeal by a prisoner would be analogous
to a petition for habeas corpus in the United States 9
The second option would be for the Palestinian Authority to
file suit against Israel in the International Court of Justice, seeking
an order for their release. Such an action would be similar to one
of the routes taken by the United States during the Iranian hostage
situation. The United States filed suit against Iran in the
International Court of Justice seeking an order to free the
hostages."' The International Court of Justice did issue that
order,44' but because the International Court of Justice has no real
enforcement powers, that order was of no significance beyond
political and propaganda purposes.
An order by the International Court of Justice to release PLO
fedayeen likely would also be of little legal significance. 442 It
would be of great political and propaganda value, however. To
grant such an order, the International Court of Justice would first
438 Israel's Basic Law: Administration of Justice. Dr. Amnon Rubinstein, War and
the Rule of Law: The Israeli Experience, I Sec. 15(d)(1) (June 1993) (A. G. Publications
Ltd., trans.).
439 See Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered
Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 262, 273 (1971); ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 322, 324
(1971); Harold Rudolph, The Judicial Review of Administrative Detention Orders in
Israel, 14 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 148, 179 (1984) (discussing the uses of petitions
before the Israeli Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus); see also JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 10 (1991) (describing the nature of a
writ of habeas corpus).
440 See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic And Consular Staff In Tehran,
1979 I.C.J. 7.
441 See id. at 20-21.
442 This is based on the assumption that Israel would likely refuse to honor such an
order and that effective coercion by outside actors on Israel would not be forthcoming.
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have to rule on the issue of whether the Palestinian Authority is
the government of a Palestinian state."3 This is because only states
have standing before the International Court of Justice.4 " Disputes
between a state and a non-state actor will not be heard."5 To hear a
suit brought by the Palestinian Authority, the International Court
of Justice would have to find that the areas of the West Bank and
Gaza which the Palestinian Authority controls are a state.46 Such
a holding would have political value both in negotiations with
Israel and in gaining recognition from other countries."7 Such a
ruling could form the basis for an attempt at full United Nations
membership.40
The differences between these two avenues are enormous.
While the International Court of Justice would likely be a much
more hospitable forum for these issues, suing in the Israeli system,
if successful, would provide greater utility to PLO fedayeen. The
Israeli Supreme Court could order the release of PLO fedayeen
13 See Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J.
457 (1991); Kathryn M. McKinney, Comment, The Legal Effects of the Israeli-PLO
Declaration of Principles: Steps Toward Statehood For Palestine, 18 PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 93 (1994); David I. Schulman, Recent Development, The Israel-PLO Accord on
the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements: The First Step
Toward Palestinian Self-Determination, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 793 (1993) (discussing
the issue of Palestinian statehood).
I See International Court of Justice, supra note 317, art. 34(1).
445 See M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 661-662 (1991).
446 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States created four criteria
for statehood: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government; and
(4) the ability to enter into relations with other states. See Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 3 Bevans 145
(1933). Two interpretive theories have since developed. One, the declarative theory,
holds that "a political entity professing to be a state would in fact be one if it,
objectively, complies with the criteria... enunciated in the Montevideo Convention."
J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood In International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 9, 12
(1991). The other, the constitutive theory, "is founded on the assumption that statehood
is dependent on the political entity in question being recognized as a state by other
states." Id. The declaratory is the more accepted theory of the two. See id.
447 The position of Israel remains that the West Bank and Gaza do not make up a
Palestinian State. As Ambassador Colette Avital has stated, "[T]he status of these
territories has not been changed by the agreement, as stated, inter alia, in Article XI(I)
of the Interim Agreement." Avital Letter, supra note 261.
4, See van ded Vyver, supra note 446, at 20-28 (discussing the relationship
between United Nations membership and the recognition of statehood).
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who were not guilty of war crimes. Suing before the International
Court of Justice, however, could produce a finding of statehood
which would have great political value even if an order for release
from that Court might not be obeyed by Israel.
VIII. Conclusion
Even with the recognition of the PLO and the creation of an
embryonic Palestinian state, the argument for granting prisoner of
war status to PLO fedayeen is questionable at best. While a
change in status would entitle PLO fedayeen to release at the end
of hostilities, which would ostensibly occur when the upcoming
final round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is
finished, 449 any real chance for such a release is grounded in the
political, not the legal, sphere.
The first basis for granting prisoner of war status is the
argument that privileged combatancy should be applied
retroactively under the Third Geneva Convention. While a case
can be made that being a "Party to the conflict" is retroactive, 50 the
holdings in Mohamed Ali and Ex Parte Quirin show that violations
of Article 4A(2)'s four enumerated requirements should not be
overcome by a later adherence to those four criteria. 451
The second basis for granting prisoner of war status is if
Protocol I was held to be a codification of customary international
law. While this is unlikely, even if it were found to be so, Israel
falls into the category of a persistent objector to such a custom and
thus would not be bound by that custom.
452
The final basis for granting prisoner of war status would be
reliance on an international custom that requires members of
liberation movements to be treated as prisoners of war if and when
their movements are recognized politically.453 While in many
cases states have treated prisoners as de facto prisoners of war
449 PLOfedayeen who are guilty of war crimes of course would not be eligible for
such a release.
450 This case is in conflict with the earlier analogy to the criminal law on
justifications and excuses. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
451 See supra notes 308-39 and accompanying text.
452 See supra notes 340-46 and accompanying text.
413 See supra notes 347-428 and accompanying text.
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after hostilities are over, whether these countries have felt legally
bound to do so is another question.454 Any custom which could be
argued to exist would also be non-binding on Israel because of its
consistent objection to prisoner of war criteria differing from that
of the Third Geneva Convention.4S
Any legal attempt to change the prisoner of war status of PLO
fedayeen would likely fail. But even without a persuasive legal
argument to grant prisoner of war status to PLOfedayeen, a sound
political argument can be made in favor of simply granting
amnesty to these prisoners. If Israel and a Palestinian state are to
eventually be neighbors, some form of reproachment must be
made. Years of bloodshed separate the two people, and they will
likely never live beside each other harmoniously. Only through
some form of reconciliation or healing process is there any chance
that those tensions can be reduced. But to grant such an amnesty is
in itself a danger to peace if those that are released have not
forsworn violence and their victims have not forsworn revenge.
CHRISTOPHER C. BuRRIs
154 See supra notes 347-428 and accompanying text.
455 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 221008
